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8 April 2009

Stephen Martin
1730 Washington Street
San Francisco, CA 94109

Dear Mr. Martin:

In response to your 31 March 2009 letter, we enclose complimentary copies of the operations reports for the 32nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized. Because of the small amount of pages, there is no charge.

We hope the enclosures meet your research needs.

Sincerely,

Amy Schmidt
Archivist, Modern Military Records
Textual Archives Services Division

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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32d Reconnaissance Troop - Gpn Report
32d Inf Div
Autopsie

10 Feb 44-1 Apr 44
1 May -15 Aug 44
Mueler

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

15 August 1944

SUBJECT: Unit Historical Report.

TO : Adjutant General, APO 32.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is divided into two main parts: (1) The Saidor Campaign (10 February 1944 to 1 April 1944), and (2) The Aitape Campaign (1 May 1944 to 15 August 1944). It is a chronological narrative of records and events based on two separate and distinct amphibious operations off the Northern Coast of New Guinea in which the 32d Reconnaissance Troop participated. In both cases the Troop was an organic part of a Task Force under the Direction of the Commanding General.

2. Detailed reports by patrol leaders concerning subsequent land operations are incorporated in this report as they summarize accurately the primary activities of the unit. Moreover, in their reports, the Troop Commander and the patrol leaders have made pertinent comments, suggestions and recommendations which form a synopsis of the results accomplished and experiences gained by the entire troop.

3. Throughout operations to this date, the 32nd Reconnaissance Troop has been considered a G-2 function with the primary mission of reconnaissance, or collecting of timely and valuable information of the enemy, terrain, topography, geography, trails, and maps.

4. In these two campaigns involving the New Guinea jungle type of terrain and warfare, the mission of the troop was accomplished primarily by the employment of dismounted long distance ground patrols, and secondarily by aerial reconnaissance liaison flights. In the former, the Australia New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) assisted greatly by furnishing patrol officers who, owing to their previous military or civilian administrative experience in Mandated Territories, were familiar with the type of zones and sectors to be reconnoitered by our patrols. Police boys and native carriers under the supervision of ANGAU assisted with supply and evacuation as well as scouting and patrolling. The success of our patrolling in hostile regions with respect to both the enemy and the wildly rugged terrain encountered, was due in no small measure to ANGAU, without whose cooperation the campaigns in New Guinea would have been prolonged indefinitely and rendered more costly to the Allies than they actually were.

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[unclear] 15/11/44
[unclear] 1/1/45

5. The Troop Carrier Command and Piper Cub liason planes provided air transport for reconnaissance flights and "biscuit bombing" missions. Our inland patrols relied almost exclusively on re-supply by dropping from C-47 planes.

6. All members of the troop gained valuable knowledge and experience pertaining to jungle warfare which information is discussed and amplified in the patrol leaders' reports, incorporated herewith.

PART I

THE SAIDOR CAMPAIGN

At the beginning of this operation the troop strength was as follows: 8 officers and 196 enlisted men. Captain George Mac E Bowles was Troop Commander; 1st Lt. Hubert P Ohm, Executive Officer; 1st Lt. Edward H Baxter, 1st Platoon Leader; 2nd Lt. Lynn A Sands, 2nd Platoon Leader; 2nd Lt Edward W Londrigan, 3rd Platoon Leader, 2nd Lt. Louis J Wortham, Mess Officer, and 2nd Lt Roland Richert, Communications, Liason, and S-2 Officer. 1st Lt. Bernard J Lillie, Motor Maintenance and Supply Officer, with 36 enlisted men, was in charge of the rear echelon at Goodenough Island (in the D'Entrecasteaux Group of islands off the Eastern tip of New Guinea).

On 12 February 1944, Lt Wortham and 12 enlisted men departed from Finschaven, New Guinea, by LST, as a forward echelon detail to Saidor, New Guinea, with the mission of selecting and preparing a base camp for the Troop which was to follow in approximately a week. From 13 February 1944 to 20 February 1944, the Troop made preparations for movement. During this period the Troop also furnished work details by order of G-4 to the LST landing strips at Cape Cretin and Dreger Harbor, New Guinea.

By order of the Commanding General, the Troop was directed to proceed by water transportation to Saidor, New Guinea. On 21 February 1944, 6 officers and 152 enlisted men boarded on LST at 1000L, and the convoy of 4 LST's and 3 destroyers sailed from Cape Cretin, New Guinea at 1600L. Islands off the western tip of New Britain were visible to the starboard at 1800L. The convoy arrived without incident at Saidor, New Guinea, 22 February 1944 at 0840L. The Troop, less 1 officer and 6 enlisted men detailed to unload organizational equipment and impedimenta from the LST, moved along the coastal track about five miles to Helmholtz Point, where a base camp was established. Two days were spent clearing and preparing this camp. The Troop was alerted by G-2 for a mission.

At this time, elements of the 32d Infantry Division Task Force were engaging the enemy at Cape Iris near the mouth of the Mot River. Strafing and bombing of Jap positions on the Mot River could be observed from our base at Helmholtz Point across Wab Bay, a distance of several miles. Daily, heavy artillery barrages were laid down by our Task Force pieces. The enemy was finally driven from Cape Iris and west across the Mot River early in March 1944.

On 25 February 1944, by order of G-2, Troop Headquarters, 1st and 3rd Platoons comprising 5 officers (Capt. Bowles, Lt. Ohm, Lt. Baxter, Lt. Londrigan, and Lt. Wortham) and 111 enlisted men departed from Helmholtz Point on a reconnaissance mission inland. For detailed report of this mission and results accomplished refer to Exhibit "A".

The 2nd platoon, comprising 46 enlisted men under the command of Lt. Sands and Assistant Platoon Leader, Lt. Richert, remained at Helmholtz Point awaiting further orders. On 2 March 1944, by order

of G-2, the 2nd platoon proceeded by LCV to Yamaia, New Guinea, where the platoon was assigned to the 2nd Battalion Combat Team of the 126 Infantry Regiment. The platoon received all subsequent orders from the Regimental S-2. It was attached to "H" company for rations while at Yamaia.

On 3 and 4 March 1944 the Battalion Combat Team conducted practice landings and several "dry runs" along the beach near Yamaia. LCT's, LCV's, and PT boats were employed. Boat crews were assigned. Tactical formations of the convoy were rehearsed. At 1400L 4 March 1944 the officers and men of the combat team were briefed on the mission by Regimental Commander, Col. Barlow, and Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Dixon.

Following the completion of this operation, Lt. Sands made only a verbal report of his patrols to the Regimental S-2. Therefore, the activities of his patrols are presented herewith. (See Exhibit "B")

CLOSE OF SAIDOR CAMPAIGN

On 3 March 1944, the rear echelon detail comprising Lt. Lillie and twenty two men which had been stationed at Goodenough Island, arrived at our base camp, Helmholtz Point, Saidor, New Guinea.

On 12 March 1944, Troop Headquarters, first and third platoons returned to base camp at Helmholtz Point and went into a rest period. During a special troop formation (less second platoon which was still in field with 126 Infantry) on 14 March 1944, Col. Hawkins, AC of S, G-2 commended the officers and men of the unit for their excellent performance on last mission (described in Exhibit "A").

Air alerts were frequent in the Saidor sector at this time. Bombs fell in the area on 13 and 15 March 1944. During the latter raid a small fuel dump at the air strip was hit. A single enemy plane strafed gun positions after the bombing. Air alerts occurred on 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 27 March 1944 with no damage resulting.

30 March 1944 Lt Baxter and 2 men left Helmholtz Point by order of G-2 on a special mission. (Refer to Exhibit "C").

8 April 1944 at 2100L a Jap medium bomber hit the 114th Engineer area approximately 400 yards from the Troop C.P., inflicting 33 casualties. 32d Reconnaissance Troop men and officers assisted in the evacuation of dead and wounded to the 23rd Field Hospital, 10 miles distant.

The second platoon returned from duty with the 126th Infantry on 12 April 1944 and went into brief rest period.

The Saidor campaign was officially closed. All Division troops were inspected by the Commanding General.

From 12 April 1944 to 20 April 1944 the troop entered a training program with special emphasis on BAR, pidgin English, and radio instruction. During this period the unit also furnished (by order of G-4) details to the Force Ammunition Dump at Saidor.

On 23 April 1944, Lt. Ohm was placed on SD with Division Headquarters and subsequently transferred to the 31st Reconnaissance Troop 31st Infantry Division.

On 28 April 1944, Capt. George Mac E Bowles, was relieved of command of the troop, transferred to the hospital, and Lt. Lillie was appointed acting Troop Commander, by order of G-2.

In accordance with instructions from G-2, 4 officers and 150 men boarded the transport USS Harry Lee, at 1630L.

PART II

THE AITAPE CAMPAIGN

On 1 May 1944 the Harry Lee departed from Saidor, New Guinea at 1830L for an undisclosed destination. During the night 1 - 2 May 1944 the convoy passed near the Admiralty Islands. On 3 May 1944 the convoy arrived at Aitape, New Guinea. The landing was made near the abandoned native village Krako. Upon debarkation the troop moved 6 miles west of the landing point and along the coastal road to the western edge of Tadji Plantation (near the plantation buildings). At this point and about 200 yards from the beach, a base camp was established.

4 and 5 May 1944 were spent cleaning the area.

6 May 1944 a patrol of five men was ordered by G-2 to investigate the area near the Old Government Drome, west of Aitape, where Jap activity had been reported. This patrol returned same date with negative information. Evidence of recent Jap occupation was observed. Pieces of Jap Cavalry gear were found in the area.

On 9 May 1944, Lt. Londrigan and 20 men from the third platoon left Tadji on a patrol mission southeast of Aitape. For complete report on results of this mission refer to Exhibit "D".

On 10 May 1944, 7 enlisted men left troop C.P. on a mission with ANGAU. Refer to Exhibit "E" for report of this patrol.

14 and 15 May 1944, five men reported to G-2 and were briefed on a secret mission.

On night of 16/17 May 1944, Cpl Bozart and Pvt Danz went on a special amphibious patrol. They debarked from a PT boat to a small rubber boat, rowed ashore, and landed near Rocky Cliff, 25 - 30 miles behind the lines. They reported much Jap activity in the hinterland, including movement west along the coastal track, a small bivouac $\frac{1}{2}$ mile east of Rocky Cliff with the Japs preparing food and a truck stalled just inland from the beach.

THE EASTERN SECTOR

On 18 May 1944, Lt. Sands and twelve men departed from Tadji by LCV to Nyaparake, New Guinea. They had been assigned the mission by G-2 of capturing an enemy prisoner in the area south of Nyaparake.

On 19 May 1944 the first and second platoons (Lt Baxter and 75 men) by order of G-2 left Tadji for Nyaparake by LCV. They were to be used on reconnaissance missions and OP duty. The third platoon made preparations to join the first and second platoons.

The first and second platoons landed at Nyaparake, occupied a perimeter of defense and commenced patrolling. Capt Herman Bottcher was transferred from company A, 127th Infantry and placed in command of the 32d Reconnaissance Troop. At this time the troop took over the mission of Company A, 127th Infantry, relieving the latter, who

departed for Aitape, less one platoon which remained at Nyaparake with the Troop.

The situation of the enemy, and the mission of the Troop, as stated by General Martin, Commander of the Eastern Sector, was now as follows: The enemy was evidently moving west toward the Driniumor River in unknown strength. The Troop was to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. If opposed by superior forces, the Troop was to withdraw slowly and delay as long as possible. In addition, the orders were: "vigorous, aggressive patrolling toward the Dandriwad; withdraw and delay slowly to the Driniumor River line."

A chronological narrative of events as they occurred on the eastern flank during the period for which this unit was responsible is presented herewith.

20 - 21 May 1944

On 20 May 1944, the third platoon and Troop Headquarters under Lt. Lillie and Lt. Richert left Tadjil base at 0800K to join the first and second platoons at Nyaparake.

At about 1000K, the first and second platoons and part of "A" company were bombed and strafed by our own Air Force (squadron of A-20's) who mistook the Dandriwad River for the Dandinain River as the bomb line. One man was killed and four injured, all from "A" company.

- a. On 20 May, Lt. Sands and 12 men were sent along the coastal track east of Nyaparake on the mission of capturing a prisoner. This patrol proceeded as far as Drimbol Plantation, where it was pinned down by enemy mortar, machine guns, and sniper fire. One Jap was killed in the encounter. Enemy strength was estimated to be 15 men. Lt. Sands then withdrew approximately 500 yards west and established a perimeter. 60mm mortar fire was placed on the Japs, causing them to withdraw to the east.
- b. On 21 May 1944, Lt. Sands' patrol again attempted to go eastward and was pinned down. We were now in contact with an enemy force estimated as 50 - 75, or perhaps a reinforced platoon. The enemy was armed with three automatic weapons, three or four grenade dischargers (knee mortar) and rifles. Our patrol set up a perimeter and outpost for the night approximately 500 yards to the west of Drimbol Plantation.
- c. During the period, three patrols operated from Nyaparake south of the perimeter as follows:
 1. Lt. Monroe's patrol ("A" company, 127th Infantry) southeast of Nyaparake near Anapaluk saw 3 japs on a trail south of Drimbol Plantation on 19 May. The Japs had no packs but were armed. In the vi-

vicinity, the coconut trees and go palms had been cut. On 20 May this reconnaissance patrol heard chopping and hammering from an area 1 mile east of Anapaluk, but could not estimate the strength of the Japs there. Several billy cans were found in the area. At 0615K on 20 May, three Japs with light packs were moving northwest on the trail 3/4 mile east of Anapaluk. Seven Japs, armed, were observed moving north at a point 3/4 mile south east of Anapaluk.

2. On 20 May S/Sgt Cagle and twelve men were sent south of the perimeter, their mission being to observe and report any enemy activity, and capture a prisoner. Anapaluk was their objective. They made camp and spent the night at Tomah Creek without incident. At 0700K, on 21 May, 1 Jap was observed filling his canteen near the junction of the Dandriwad and Damein Creek. The patrol shot the Jap and drew fire from 18 - 20 Japs. Some papers were obtained. The patrol after drawing fire, moved to the west and saw a group of 3 - 4 Japs. The patrol turned to the east and encountered a Jap force of twelve. Three Japs were killed. The patrol was unable to reach Anapaluk. The patrol "went bush" into the foothills, west towards Julup at which point it followed a small stream northward back to the C.P. on the ocean beach.
3. Lt. De Leon's roving patrol ("A" company 127 Infantry) on the southern perimeter reported that our booby traps put out in the area 2000 yards southeast of Nyaparake were disarmed about 1400K. Several fresh foot prints were found in the vicinity.
4. A wire crew found a quantity of old Jap documents at a point approximately 500 yards east of Drinimor River mouth.

21 - 22 May

- a. No activity in the perimeter during the forenoon, 22 May. The Japs crossed the small stream east of Nyaparake on the right flank of Lt. Sand's O.P. His O.P. was ordered to withdraw several hundred yards toward the main perimeter and 60 mm mortar fire was placed on the area forward of the O.P.
- b. Cpl Hammon took a seven man patrol south from the main perimeter on reconnaissance, where they encountered four Japs. Our point scouts opened fire wounding three. All four fled into the bush.
- c. Lt. Baxter and twenty men left Nyaparake at 1200K on a mission to Yakamul. Lt. Baxter was to establish a base at

Yakamul and send out small reconnaissance patrols south of that point to observe the Charov - Afua trail for enemy activity.

- d. At 1600K the C.G. issued orders for the Troop to withdraw west to Parakovic. Lt. Sand's patrol was then sent to Parakovic to prepare positions for the Troop to occupy on withdrawal. While this patrol was preparing position one of our men was fired on by a three man Jap patrol. Our return fire wounded one Jap who abandoned his rifle on a log in a nearby creek. The three escaped into the jungle.
- e. The prearranged signal for moving out of Nyaparake was a luminous shell from a 60 mm mortar. Time of departure was 1700K. Withdrawal of the Troop was delayed because the Amphibious Engineers were attempting to get the supply escort LCM off-shore where it had been beached the previous day. A bulldozer and a tugboat were being used to move the LCM. The tug also became stuck on a sand bar. Finally, at 1900K, the ships' crews successfully extricated both craft. At 1910K the luminous shell was fired. On this signal the outpost crews withdraw to the beach where each platoon organized. The light of the shell revealed three Japs near a small creek who were observed by our outpost as the evacuation was made. While the Troop was organizing on the beach for the withdrawal to Parakovic, a mortar barrage was laid down all around the perimeter to confuse and delay the enemy.
- f. At 1920L the troop moved westward along the beach with the bulldozer in the lead. Two BAR men were placed on the blade for protection. This entire evacuation was hazardous, but orders had been issued to withdraw and in order not to lose valuable equipment to the enemy, the bulldozer preceded the column. No opposition to this move was made. At 2200L, our point contacted Lt. Sand's guides who led the troop to respective defense positions.

22 - 23 May

- a. Lt. Baxter's patrol operating south of Yakamul reported seeing two Japs approximately three miles south of Yakamul, 1/4 mile east of the Harech River. The patrol remained in position and at 1515L it observed a party of approximately 120 Japs moving west along the track from Charov to and across the Harech River. Lt. Baxter's small group was forced to withdraw because it had been detected by an enemy flank guard.
- b. At 0800L, T/Sgt Miller and seven men were sent out to make a reconnaissance of Nyaparake to determine whether the village had been seized by the enemy following our withdrawal. They observed some activity but were unable to reach the village as there was an open beach of 800 Yards to traverse. This patrol returned to Parakovic.

At 1000, Lt. Lillie, with a patrol of seven men plus a 60 mm Mortar squad, proceeded to within range and observation of Nyaparake. Ten rounds of 60 mm Mortar shell were placed on the village with undetermined results. At 1600K the troop withdrew 1000 yards to an unnamed village and dug in for the night. At 2000K, Pvt. Donati, while on O.P duty, shot himself through the shoulder.

- c. At 2400K, the C.G. directed the troop to withdraw again. This decision was based on the information of Lt. Baxter's patrol indicating that a large body of Japs were moving west inland, and behind us, thereby, creating the definite enemy capability of cutting off and/or annihilating our small force.

- d. Capt. Bottcher set time for withdrawal at 0030K. Lt. Baxter at Yakamul was informed that we would withdraw to his position and he was instructed to post guides at the beach.

All of our forward and flank outposts were informed of time of withdrawal by sound power phone and laterally by runner. The outposts were instructed to go to the beach by the most direct route and organize there.

- e. On moving out the withdrawal of the patrol was again impeded in this case by an amphibian $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck. This had been used for ferrying supplies from the supply escort LOM, which could not be brought close to shore because of shallow beach. The plan was to have the amphibian drive on the foreshore, parallel to the troop column instead of going into the water. The reason for this was that the amphibian might lose contact with the column owing to darkness and low visibility at this time, across water space.

It became stuck on a log and held up movement for two hours. After it was extricated, Capt. Bottcher directed that the amphibian move by water and parallel to the middle of our column. On arrival at Yakamul, our forward scouts were to flash subdued lights out at sea and signal the vehicle shoreward at proper place.

The patrol arrived at Yakamul unopposed at 0230K where Lt. Baxter successfully guided the troop to prepared positions.

23 - 24 May

- a. On 23 May, Lt. De Leon (A Co. 127 Infantry) took a patrol of twelve men (6 from Ren. Troop and 6 from the Int.) south of Yakamul $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles inland from the O.P. where they engaged what was presumably the point of a company, actually contacting 6 men. Three were killed by Ren. men and 1 by "A" company. One light machine gun and one .25 caliber rifle were captured as the patrol successfully disengaged the enemy and reformed about 1300 yards south of Yakamul.

- b. On 23 May, Lt. Lillie and seven men took a trail south of Yakamul at 1230K to make a reconnaissance of the area in a north-south line to the foothills of the Tawallis. It was believed, on basis of Lt. Barter's information concerning the 120 Japs sighted, that this was an advance group of a large force moving from east to west. Lt. Lillie's patrol was to confirm this and report all activity.
- c. The troop moved out of Yakamul at 1330K to (21.6 - 40.7) Suain West Sheet 1st equals 1 mile). A tight perimeter was established and the night passed without incident.

24 - 25 May

- a. On 24 May, Lt. Lillie's patrol reported in at 1000K. Late 24 May the patrol observed approximately 25 Japs cutting a new trail and building foot bridges across the small streams approximately two miles south of Yakamul. The Japs were using axes, saws, and explosives for this purpose. The track was observed to be sufficient width for a 70mm Bn. gun. The patrol remained in position over night and on morning 25 May, they heard many sounds of trail building. It was estimated that 100 Japs were engaged in this activity.

On return route to the coastal track, this patrol met a party of three Japs 1 mile west of Yakamul, killing all three. Lt. Lillie believed five other Japs were nearby but a thorough reconnaissance of the area failed to locate the Japs. The patrol reported that there were numerous small tracks throughout this vicinity leading inland from native villages to native gardens.

- b. Lt. Londrigan arrived at the Field C.P. with 15 replacements from Tadji C.P. Lt. Sands with the fresh men was sent out on mission toward Yakamul, thence south inland to obtain a prisoner. They were out two miles, when they were ambushed. The patrol encountered light machine guns, knee mortar and sniper fire. One Jap was killed. Two of our men believed killed in action were abandoned and the remainder returned for reinforcements and a rescue party. First Sgt. Jensen took a volunteer patrol to extricate the two men. On arriving at the scene it was found that the men were in a dense jungle, unhurt, but had been knocked unconscious for a few minutes by mortar fire. They were revived and the patrol returned to C.P. Lt. Sands continued on his mission.

- c. Lt. De Leon took a patrol southeast of Yakamul.

25 - 26 May

- a. Lt. De Leon's patrol operating south of Yakamul sighted three Japs at 1200K, 25 May at a point approximately two miles south of Yakamul. The Japs fled before our patrol could fire on them. At 1730K the patrol heard explosions from the east.

26 - 27 May

- a. Lt. De Leon's patrol observed fresh tracks of three Japs approximately one mile southwest of Yakamul. A native hut in the vicinity contained 5 or 6 bedding or clothing rolls wrapped in rice matting. The door of the hut was nailed shut with new galvanized nails. The patrol proceeded to a cane brake approximately 2 miles south of Yakamul and approximately 300 yards east of the trail leading south from Yakamul and discovered 8 - 10 Japs cooking food, three others moving about and sounds of other Japs in the area. From this position the patrol heard intermittent explosions to the southwest and also what the patrol thought to be the mooing of a cow. While resting along the trail east of the Harech River, about 3 miles south of Yakamul, 5 - 6 Japs approached from the south. Our patrol was detected and killed two Japs and probably two more. A new native hut containing Jap tools and partially constructed tables and chairs was located approximately 2 miles southeast of Yakamul. On return route to the outpost, the patrol was fired on by an unknown number of Japs from the south as the patrol crossed a stream approximately one mile south-south east of Yakamul.
- b. On 27 May, General Martin, Commander of the Eastern Sector, visited our front lines and gave a short talk to the officers and NCO's at 1200K. During this conference, an estimated 2 - 4 Japs attacked our O.P. #2, about 75 yards from our meeting place across a small lagoon. A Jap threw a grenade at our machine gun crew, but missed. Opl Cross raised up from the emplacement to fire with his carbine. The Jap tried to rush our position, screaming the usual Banzai attack. He was wounded and with 2 others, turned and fled.
- c. Lt. Baxter and 18 men were prepared at this time to move out on a 3-day patrol. They first proceeded to O.P. #2, and searched carefully the area for the Japs who attacked (b above), but found only blood stains and abandoned gear. Lt. Baxter's mission was to proceed south toward the Toricelli foot hills and observe any enemy activity. On the strength of Lt. Lillie's report, it was believed that the Japs were building an east-west trail for large scale movement. It was desired to find out whether the Japs had crossed west of an imaginary line north-south of Yakamul, and to confirm previously reported activity. At this time our intelligence was as follows: A Jap force of undetermined strength was proceeding west, inland, and parallel to the coast. Very probably the small parties encountered by our patrols near the coast were enemy flanker patrols on reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance missions operating from their main body. It was also believed that a force was proceeding west along coastal track. No units had been identified. It was, therefore, highly desired to obtain a prisoner, who might yield valuable information.

27 - 28 May

27 - 28 May

- a. S/Sgt Cagle and 20 men proceeded east toward Yakumul along the coast with the mission of preparing an ambush to capture a prisoner. At 2000 yards from our C.P. the patrol observed an unarmed Jap on the beach, and as they moved toward him, were fired upon from several widely separated points. During our attempts to outflank the ambush the Japs broke contact. Sgt Cagle then withdrew to O.P. #1, re-inforced this post, and dug in for the night.

S/Sgt Shafman was sent inland with the same mission. He proceeded to a suitable position about 1000 yards and set up an ambush. At 1600K 2 Japs approached his position. It had been planned to disable the enemy by wounding in the legs and arms. Members of our patrol carried this out, but as they rushed in for the capture, were thwarted when the enemy placed grenades to their bodies, committing suicide.

- b. Cpl Fitcox was wounded at 1800K (SIW).
- c. Lt. Sands and Lt Londrigan were relieved of command and returned to Division Headquarters, pending investigation. 2nd Lt Settrini was transferred to the troop from 125 Infantry.
- d. On 28 May, S/Sgt Cagle and S/Sgt Shafman were ordered to take a combat patrol east of C.P. along coast to contact the enemy. At 0900K the patrol encountered approximately 70 - 80 enemy, about 2000 yards west of Yakumul. Ensuing fire fight lasted 2 hours. Capt Bottcher commandeered the supply escort LCM armed with rocket launcher, 37mm cannon and .50 cal. machine guns, and proceeded along the coast directing fire on enemy area. The LCM received small arms fire. This action inflicted no casualties, but it forced the enemy inland. The entire engagement lasted till noon. Our patrols withdrew to the outpost line and established a strong perimeter. All men were extremely fatigued and nervous. Relief was urgently needed.

28 - 29 May

- a. S/Sgt Shafman, with his same patrol, left C.P. at 0800K on mission of regaining contact which had been broken off by Japs during night. The patrol was out approximately 1000 yards when Pvt. Frazier was shot through the hand by a sniper. The O.P. called C.P. by phone for aid men. Two aid men, plus 2 rifleman for security, went out to bring in Frazier.

On reconnoitering further, the patrol sighted 5 Japs rapidly fleeing east at 1605K.

- b. T/Sgt Miller's patrol of 6 men operating 500 yards south of C.P. and 2, 300 yards east and west reported no contact

29 - 30 May

- a. Lt Baxter's 3-day patrol returning 30 May, reported the following observations: 4 explosions were heard to the south east of our O.P., approximately 2 miles west of Yakumul, an east-west trail was discovered approximately 3 miles east of Afua. From 1400K - 1500K, the patrol observed 4 Japs moving west with packs and rifles. At 1510K, 15 Japs with packs and rifles were going east. At 1545K, 8 Japs went west and at 1615K, 3 Japs went east. On 29 May, one party of 6 Japs were observed wandering in the Niimen Creek area and an apparent O.P. of 3 Japs in the vicinity. Along Niimen Creek approximately 2 miles north east of Afua, the patrol was fired on by 7 Japs. Our patrol killed 3. The patrol continued south east for 400 yards where they were fired on by a Jap, who, judging from his uniform was a marine. Our patrol returned fire, and he fled. 2 more Japs were observed along Niimen Creek as the patrol returned to the O.P. 30 May.
- b. On 30 May, Sgt Schirack was sent with small patrol by bush to reconnoiter Yakumul for presence of enemy, and to remain in observation over night.
- c. "G" company, 127 Infantry arrived by barge from Tadjl to take over the mission of and relieve the troop.
The troop (less Lt Baxter's and Sgt Schirack's patrols) prepared to return to base camp. They proceeded by LCM to slip #5, Krako, thence to camp by truck. All men were in run down condition.

31 May

Lt. Baxter's and Sgt Schirack's patrols returned to the coast and came into base camp by LCM.

Capt Bottcher returned to base at 2100K after having instructed and informed C.O. of "G" company of situation in the Yakumul Sector.

From 1 June to 7 June the troop went into a brief rest and clean-up period. From 7 June to 23 June the unit furnished work details to the Force Ammunition Dump, to the Q.M., and to Air Freight.

THE SOUTHERN SECTOR

Commencing with 24 June, the troop furnished a series of long distance reconnaissance patrols to the southern flank (and behind lines) by order of G-2. Refer to Exhibit "F", which is a copy of PATROL order assigning and coordinating activities of all patrols involved in this phase of operations.

On 24 June, Lt. Lillie and 19 men departed from Troop area on a reconnaissance and O.P. mission to LUMI, under direction of G-2. For complete report of this patrol refer to Exhibit "G".

A second patrol was ordered by G-2. Lt. Barnard with 7 men departed 0700K on 26 June for reconnaissance behind the lines. See

exhibit "H" for detailed report of patrol.

The Communications Section established a message center in order to receive and handle efficiently all traffic to patrols out in the field and those which were to leave subsequently. A T.D. patrol under Lt. Pascoe was in communication with Division through our set. In order to attain maximum readability, an SCR 193 (mounted) at message center was netted with SCR 284s (dismounted) in the field.

On 29 June, Lt. Wortham and 33 men arrived from Saidor, New Guinea, to duty with the troop.

On 3 July, two more patrols were sent out by G-2. Lt Baxter and 28 men departed for Yapunda. See exhibit "I" for results.

Lt. Londrigan and 3 men left on a special amphibious patrol for G-2. Their mission was to make a pre-dawn landing 4 July on Tarawai Island (Butt-Wewak Area) and determine presence or absence of enemy activity and fortifications. An allied installation was contemplated there, so it was necessary to have this information.

Upon landing, the patrol discovered 2 sleeping Japs on the beach and believed killed 2 Japs of a small party flushed from a hut 300 yards inland. Following enemy grenade fire, an estimated 12 - 15 Japs were observed on the island as our patrol was forced to withdraw.

On 12 July, Capt Bottcher and 14 men departed from Tadjil on patrol to the Tong area (see exhibit "J" for complete report).

The troop strength at base camp during 12 July to 1 August was 3 officers and varied between 50 and 60 men. These men carried on routine duties of garrison and furnished daily details to XI Corps and 32d Division. A small supply detail was employed daily in preparing Class I, II, and IV supplies to be dropped by C-47 planes to our patrols.

The radio message center required 4 operators at all times. Meanwhile, every available man was alerted to occupy pill boxes near base camp in event of an enemy breakthrough of the Driniumor and Nigia River lines.

On August 1, Lt. Barnards patrol returned.

On 7 August, Capt Bottcher was recalled from the field to have an interview with the C.G. XI Corps, relative to the situation in the Tong area.

On 8 August, Lt. Wortham, Lt Steele and 18 men departed from base on patrol to take over the Yapunda sector, relieving Lt Baxter's patrol. Owing to change of plans this patrol was recalled 9 August (for report, see exhibit "K").

Lt. Lillie and 16 men returned from patrol of Lumi.

PRESENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS

On 17 August, Lt Baxter and 34 men returned from Yapunda. By 15 August the Division Task Force entered a transition period in which the 43d Division took over the mission and assignment of the 32d Division. The 32d Reconnaissance Troop patrols were all relieved at this time. The Aitape Campaign was officially closed 25 August 1944.

This unit, in accordance with Division Directive went into a brief rest and cleaning period. From 21 August to date the unit is undergoing a 4 week training program; at the same time it is being re-supplied and re-organized with new equipment for subsequent moves and/or operations.

SECRET

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

PATROL REPORT

EXHIBIT "A"

15 March 1944

Reference Maps: Saidor and Pommern Bay Sheet, B 55/6, NE New Guinea.
1" equals 1 mile.
Aerial Photos.

Overlay No. 1.

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL: Troop Headquarters, 1st and 3d platoons, 32d Reconnaissance Troop, five Officers and 111 Enlisted Men.
Leader: Captain George Mac E. Bowles.

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN: Departed 0945L, 25 February 1944 and returned 1720L, 12 March 1944.

3. SITUATION AND MISSION: To advance to GABUMI by the way of the YORI-WIWAI track passing through a battalion of the 128th Infantry at GABUMI, crossing the MOT RIVER and occupying MAIBANG, then moving West to ASANG on the REITE-MAIBANG track and prevent the movement of Japs to the North-West by cutting the RAMBA-ASANG track and to reconnoiter all other tracks out of ASANG for one-half day's march. To locate and destroy all Japs in this area and select possible air droppings West of MAIBANG.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED: The reconnaissance of the sectors that were assigned to the Troop showed that trails and villages as shown on the map were not accurate. Trail as shown on the maps from RAMBA to the YAKAI RIVER and down the YAKAI RIVER to the trail leading into ASANG does not exist. A trail was cut from the YAKAI RIVER to MOBAP and there is a trail from MOBAP to BONAWENA then to SORANG back to the YAKAI RIVER and to ASANG. For further information regarding the trails and villages, see attached overlay.

Troop occupied MAIBANG 1500L, 27 February 1944. Three Japs killed, telephone line strung from GABUMI to MAIBANG.

29 February 1944 - 3d platoon moving from MAIBANG to SIRIENG MISSION. 1 March 1944 entire Troop at SIRIENG MISSION.

Natives reported 1 March 1944 the presence of Japs at SEREMORE and KOREMORE. We shot a Jap officer and two enlisted men where the SENG RIVER crosses the REITE-MAIBANG track. Also this same date captured enemy machine-gun, three rifles, sixteen hand grenades, regimental records, pay books, maps, officer's insignia, money from the Phillipines and etc. Found that possible air droppings could be made at SIRIENG MISSION. Extended telephone line from MAIBANG to SIRIENG MISSION. Three enemy planes over night of 1 March 1944.

EXHIBIT "A", CONTD.

2 March 1944 patrols reached ASANG. One Jap was machine-gunned night of 1st March at SIRIENG MISSION.

3 March 1944, was spent in moving from SIRIENG MISSION to ASANG with remainder of Troop and supplies.

4 March 1944, killed 2 Japs at an old bivouac area located at (31.4-79.4) Pommern Bay Sheet. This Jap bivouac area consisted of a large headquarters, officers' mess, corrals, hospital, much abandoned equipment consisting of saddles, bridles, bags of oats, etc. Signs indicate that a mounted unit left here about three weeks ago.

5 March 1944, patrols out from ASANG to SIRIENG MISSION, from ASANG to SORANG to BONAWENA. Another patrol from ASANG to RAMBA across country to MOBAP; thence back to ASANG via BONAWENA. Patrols worked up and down the YAKAI RIVER, but did not find evidence of any Japs.

By the 8 of March 1944 the following line had been established: 1st section of the 3d platoon at point where the SENG RIVER crosses the REITE-MAIBANG track, 1 section Troop Headquarters at YAKAI RIVER crossing between ASANG and BONAWENA, 2d section of the 3d platoon at SORANG, 1st section of 1st platoon at MASI, 2d Section of the 1st platoon at MIB, Troop Headquarters at ASANG and until the 11 of March when we were withdrawn we had patrols operating from the SENG RIVER crossing on the REITE* MAIBANG track, West to a point half way between MIB and BASOR.

Total number of Japs killed: 13. Total number of Japs found dead along trails and in villages: 88. Mission assigned the Troop by G-2 accomplished 5 March 1944.

5. DETAILED REPORT: (See overlay)

a. Submitted to the AC of S, G-2, 32d Infantry Division the following enemy documents:

- (1) Overlays
- (2) Maps
- (3) Diaries
- (4) Personal letters and postcards.
- (5) Unused office stationary.
- (6) Medical Reports.
- (7) Decorations and insignia.

b. Location and nature of native villages (see overlay).

c. Character of ground covered. (see overlay).

d. Details of streams, crossings and other obstacles (refer to overlay).

6. CONDITION OF PATROL ON RETURN: The general physical condition of the men on return was fair. Eleven men were evacuated due to minor ailments. Since returning to the Troop area 32 men have developed fever which is neither malaria or dengue.

7. COMMENTS: a. Rations: Rations used during the period of operation were: (1) "C" ration, "J" ration, and the "Ten in One" ration. While on patrols individuals usually carried "C" ration. Rations were transported from one village to another by native bearers. The "Ten in One ration" was the best ration consumed by the Troop; however, movement of the Troop was so rapid at times that the "Ten in one Ration" that had been opened had to be

S E C R E T

carried in packs.

b. Equipment carried: Jungle pack consisting of the poncho, extra socks, one towel, toilet articles, medical kit, jungle sweater.

- (1) Uniform: Steel helmet, HBT, leggings, either army, Marine or jungle boot.
- (2) Ammunition and Weapons: Personal arms, 1 unit of fire per man, 3 LMG's per platoon, 8 boxes of .30 cal. ammunition per machine gun, 3 hand grenades per man.
- (3) Radios: 2 - SCR 193 and 2 - SCR 284. 1 - 193 radio remained at Division.
- (4) Demolitions: None.

c. On the morning of 27 February 1944, I requested artillery fire on the village of MAIBANG as well as on the trail leading from the MOT RIVER into MAIBANG. When I went over this trail and up into MAIBANG I found that the artillery bursts had perfectly bracketted the entire trail from the MOT RIVER up to the outskirts of MAIBANG. Two freshly killed Japs evidently killed by the artillery were found along the trail. In MAIBANG itself 24 Japanese were found on the outskirts of the village having been killed by artillery fire during the last 24 hours.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS: A. Native Bearers: It is recommended that the Troop be provided with one ANGAD NCO, two police boys and 100 bearers at the beginning of the next mission and that they remain with the Troop for the length of the entire operation. Operating in this manner will greatly increase the mobility and maneuverability of the Troop and would eliminate the carrying of rations to outposts by members of the Troop. On the last mission, the Troop was dependent to great extent on "bush natives" for carrying cargo. These "bush natives" had to be paid off for their services with rations, which ordinarily would have been eaten by Troop personnel.

It is further recommended that all rations for the Troop be assembled at a centrally located point for the beginning of the mission and that the point be used until another feeder point becomes more practicable. As an example, the last rations which came through from YORI and MAIBANG required two days to transport by way of SABUMI. Had they come along the trail on the North side of the Mot River, it would have been a one day carry from YORI to MAIBANG.

B. Type of Rations - A 100 ration breakdown of 70 "Ten in One" rations, 8 "J" rations, 8 "K" rations and 14 "C" rations is suggested for the next operation. The "Ten in One" is not sufficient in itself. It is not practical for small patrols because a great deal of the "Ten in One" has to be cooked and eaten together or wastage will result. The "J" ration is suggested because of the powdered milk, roasted peanuts, and dried fruits contained therein. The "K" ration is recommended because of the beef bouillon, lack of "C" crackers and the small amount of space it takes up in a pack. The "C" is recommended for groups which go forward of the main body into spots where it is not safe to take the natives for fear of them going "bush". The "C" ration is entirely lacking in variety and attractiveness, but it will keep soldiers going on the trail and can be eaten hot or cold if need be.

EXHIBIT "A", CONTD.

S E C R E T

c. Footwear: The Reconnaissance Troop has found that the Marine service shoe is far superior to any shoe now in use by the Army and all officers of this command have expressed the desire to purchase at least one pair of Marine shoes, if said purchase can be arranged. The jungle boot as indicated in previous reports is entirely unsatisfactory over terrain such as was covered in the Troop's last mission.

d. Weapons: It is the desire of this Officer to return to Ordnance nine of the organization's 12 LMG's. Nine LMG's carried on the last mission made 12 native bearer loads and the spare parts kits and ammunition for these weapons made up a total of 48 boy loads. The LMG's, the spare parts kits and ammunition thus employed 60 natives to move from village to village. When "bush natives" could not be employed to carry these weapons, the men carried them themselves, which decreased materially the maneuverability of the Troop.

On the basis of the above mentioned condition, it is requested that the Troop be issued nine BAR's in lieu of nine LMG's. Should BAR's be issued, the three LMG's would be employed by Troop Headquarters.

GEORGE MAC E BOWLES
Captain, Cavalry
Commanding

Incls:
Overlay
Aerial Photos.

THE YALAU OPERATION

EXHIBIT "B"

Elements of the Task Force were: 2nd Battalion 126 Infantry; AT Company, 126 Infantry; 2nd Platoon, 32d Reconnaissance Troop; "B" Battery, 120 Field Artillery; and Battalion Aid Detachment.

The mission of the Battalion Combat Team was as follows: to make an amphibious landing at Yalau Plantation, New Guinea on "D" day, 5 March 1944, at "H" hour, 0700L; to establish a perimeter for Battalion C.P.; to send out reconnaissance and combat patrols to intercept enemy straggler lines and evacuees who were apparently attempting to bypass the Saidor trap with Bogadjim or Madang as their objectives. A secondary mission was to take the small coastal village Mindiri, where a Jap hospital was reported by aerial reconnaissance. The entire operation was designed as a limited scale offensive toward Bogadjim and the harassment of the enemy's rear guard.

During this operation, the combat team was the westernmost disposition of American Troops in New Guinea. It was completed just prior to the multiple landings by elements of the Sixth Army at Tanahmerah Bay, Hollandia and Aitape in April 1944.

Contemporaneous with the 2nd battalion 126 Infantry landing at Yalau, the Australian Seventh Division was making its way through the Ramu Valley toward Bogadjim. Eventually, the 2nd battalion forward patrols were to contact Aussie patrols between Bau Plantation and Bogadjim. Initial contact was made during the first week in April 1944.

FIRST MISSION

A. Mission of the Second Platoon

Ref. Maps: Saidor and Pommern
Bay 1" equals 1 mile.

Initially, the mission of the platoon was two-fold, as follows:

1. First Section

One section of 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ men commanded by Lt. Sands was to proceed across the Gowar River and to the E bank of the Male River on "D" day; to establish a section perimeter with listening and/or observation posts, (a) near the coast and, (b) along the coastal track within observation of the W bank of the Male River. Any enemy activity or resistance encountered to this position was to be reported immediately to battalion.

2. Second Section

A second section of 10 men under Lt. Richert was to proceed to the village of Dumun on "D" day, acting as a security patrol for a 120th Field Artillery, Battery observer party of 1 officer and 4 men.

An OP was to be established at Dumun and any enemy activity and movements were to be reported to battalion.

EXHIBIT "B", CONTD.

B. Operations

1. First Section

The landing was unopposed, and the first section proceeded on 5 March 1944 at 0830L across the Sower River. They then went through Kamisanger which was unoccupied and reached the E bank of the Kale River by 1600L. A perimeter and OP system was established. Communication was maintained with battalion by field phone.

6 March 1944. The first section was ordered by Battalion Commander to reconnoiter Kul 2 and an unnamed village inland from Kul 2. Kul 2 was reached by 1200L. A small patrol was sent to reconnoiter Kul 1 and unnamed village. The unnamed village was not found. A native police boy with the first section killed a Jap between Kul 1 and Kul 2.

The first section joined a patrol from "G" company near Kul 1. Mission of the combined patrols was now to gain contact with enemy by advancing on Cape Rigny and then to Bau Plantation. Resistance was first encountered by our patrols at small creek near Kul 1 where a LMG was located guarding the crossing. Two Japs operating this OP were taken by surprise and killed. Lt. Sands with 4 men crossed the stream and raided the enemy OP. Ammunition, rice, and Japanese issue food were destroyed. Some papers and documents were found in a nearby hut. All intelligence items were sent to regimental S-2.

7 March 1944. "G" company and first section, 2nd platoon combined patrol, proceeded to small creek E of Bau and established perimeter of defence.

8 March 1944. Advance was made on Bau Plantation where perimeter was established for the night. At 1900L a small party of Japs attempted an attack but were repulsed.

9 March 1944. Reconnaissance of Bau Plantation was made E to Kambara River. Japs were making a stand at Kambara River. Col. Dixon then relieved the first section for brief rest and called on battalion for one company to maintain contact and harass the Japs along Kambara line. Estimated enemy opposition at this time was one reinforced company.

10 March 1944. Lt. Richert and 10 men who completed mission to Durun arrived at Bau joining Lt. Sands. New mission was now assigned to second platoon.

2. Second Section

Upon landing the second section proceeded along trail to Dumun. The trail was obscured through disuse and it was necessary to use bush trails. With the assistance of two police boys, the second section reached Dumun by 1600L. Combat wire had been laid by the Field Artillery crew and communication was immediately established. OP's were placed around Dumun.

No enemy activity was observed during the next 3 days, but it was learned from natives that Japs were using remote inland trails, avoiding contact and attempting to escape.

The section, its mission having been completed, was recalled by battalion S-2 on 8 March 1944 and it returned to Yalau where it awaited transportation by barge to join Lt. Sands' first section at Bau Plantation. It rejoined the platoon on 10 March 1944.

SECOND MISSION

The second platoon was now intact and a new mission was assigned by battalion commander at Bau Plantation.

1. THE SITUATION

From reliable native sources it was learned that the Japs were using a trail through Saga Saga to the Kambara River as an evacuation route, and that Saga Saga was an overnight resting place for the enemy. Two machine guns were reported covering the trail on each side of the village.

2. MISSION

The mission of the platoon was to attack and capture Saga Saga. One section of "E" company was also assigned this mission, and to be employed as an enveloping force on the village.

The second platoon was to proceed along one of two trails (north of Cape Rigny) and bivouac the night of 12 March 1944 at a point about 1500 yards from Saga Saga.

The section from "E" company was to take the second trail through Bau Plantation. Second platoon was to attack from the east and "E" company from the west. Time of attack was 1030L 13 March 1944. Artillery fire was to be placed on village night 12/13 March 1944. These batteries were located on beach near Yalau. The Air Corps had mission of bombing and strafing the village from 0900L to 0930L morning of 13 March 1944.

3. OPERATIONS

The second platoon and "E" company moved out independently from Bau Plantation on 12 March 1944. The two patrols had a rendezvous bivouac night of 12 March 1944

at a point 1500 yards from Saga Saga, arriving at 1500L. At 1600L Col. Dixon and the platoon leaders went forward to a position on trail from which Saga Saga was visible. The village was on a bald promontory, excellently situated for defence. Only one N - S trail extended through the village.

The plan was for the second platoon to be guided through the bush by the tultul of Saga Saga, and approach from a hill immediately to the east of the village.

"E" company was to approach uphill from the west and to launch the attack simultaneously with second platoon. On 13 March 1944 both patrols moved out and all plans proceeded as scheduled.

One Jap was killed in village at 1030L as both patrols attacked. Evidently during the bombing and strafing, which was very effective and accurate, the machine gun crew pulled out.

The village had been extensively used as a rest camp by enemy. Bits of native foods were lying around and new huts had been built containing bunks. Numerous fresh tracks were evident.

The Battalion Commander then sent "E" company back to Bau Plantation. The second platoon was to occupy the village and set up an ambush along trail leading into village from the south.

Between 13 March 1944 and 18 March 1944 the second platoon killed 17 Japs by ambush, and stripped the enemy dead of all belongings. About one out of four were armed. Some were well clothed. Stacks of records were being carried by those killed. Obviously, they were evacuees seeking escape toward the coast and Bogadjim. Continuous contact had been maintained with battalion C.F. by SCR 284, informing battalion of all activity.

The second platoon was relieved by another section from "E" company on 18 March 1944, and returned to Bau Plantation, thence by barge to Yalau Plantation where it went into rest period.

EXHIBIT "B", CONTD.

THIRD MISSION

1. SITUATION

Toward the end of March the Japs were no longer using the route through Saga Saga, as they were aware that our troops controlled the area. They were cutting new trails inland to the west through Dinam and Nebu. During the later part of March, Lt. Gillette had been ordered to capture Dinam and set up ambush there.

2. MISSION

On 3 April 1944 the second platoon was assigned a third and final mission. One section under Lt. Sands was to go to Nebu and set up an ambush there.

The second section under Sgt. Schirack was to proceed to Dinam and relieve Lt. Gillette's patrol. Both patrols were to reconnoiter the immediate areas and report on extent of enemy activity.

3. OPERATIONS

Both patrols left Yalau on 2 April 1944 and arrived at respective villages on 6 April 1944. Between 6 - 8 April 1944, six poorly armed, fairly well clothed enemy were killed at Dinam and five at Nebu. This patrol was again relieved by Lt. Gillette's section and ordered to return to Yalau. Total enemy killed by platoon on these three missions was 28. We suffered no casualties from enemy action. Pvt. Snodgrass died at 18th Portable Hospital, Yalau, New Guinea as result of typhus contracted on patrol.

The platoon arrived at Yalau 10 April 1944, and returned to base camp, Hacholtz point on 12 April 1944.

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

EWB/vgg

EXHIBIT "C"

15 June 1944

PATROL REPORT

Map References: Saidor, 1 inch equals 1 mile.
Singorkai, 1 inch equals 1 mile.
Nankina, 1 inch equals 1 mile.

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL:

- a. Patrol Leader - 1st Lt Edward H Baxter.
- b. Composition of patrol - Opl Lilly, Tec 5 Koschmann (radio operator), WO Osborn (Angau representative), two police boys and 39 carriers.

2. COMMUNICATIONS:

- a. One SCR - 284
- b. One set air-ground liaison panels.
- c. Native runners.

3. RATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT:

- a. Ten and one and class "C" rations were used.
- b. Standard jungle equipment and packs were carried.

4. SUPPLY:

- a. Ten and one and class "C" rations and equipment for 12 days were carried.
- b. Subsequent requirements were landed on the coast by barge.

5. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN:

- a. Departed Saidor (Wilwilan Beach) 12 April 1944, 0915K.
- b. Returned to Saidor, 2 May 1944, 1500K.

6. MISSIONS:

- a. To establish a base in the Tapen-Gabutamon area and using natives to patrol area and contact bush natives, to try to gain some information concerning Piper Cub observation plane and its occupants (pilot and Maj Kindig), This plane having been forced down about three months before.
- b. Mission changed to include search for B-24 Liberator and its occupants, which crashed 16 April 1944.

7. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. Contacted all native groups between Marawum and Kepoiak and from Yagonai to Roimji and none could give any information of crashed Piper Cub or its occupants.
- b. Patrol located crashed B-24 Liberator at Singorkai sheet (73.8 - 52.8) and aided in the rescue and evacuation of seven of its ten occupants.

P A T R O L L O G12 April 1944

Left Wilwilan Beach by LCM at 0915K, landed at Gali at 1230K. Plan to advance along Tapen-Gabutamon track, establish base and send natives to check side trails and villages. Reached Ruange 1615K, established camp for night. Trail steep, about 15 Jap skeletons along route, 6 or 8 burned or buried in Ruange.

13-15 April 1944

Departed Ruange, arrived Bwani 1330K, 13 April 1944, camped for night. Visited bush village, contacted Iuluai who knew nothing of Piper Cub. Arrived Tapen 14 April 1944 at 0915K. Large village almost entirely burned, more than 100 Jap skeletons in village. Set up base outside village. Contacted village officials who could give no information of Piper Cub. Morning of 15 April sent one native patrol to villages to E and S and another to Moam. Instructed to bring village officials back to Tapen for questioning. Negative report from Moam and Gabwtamon, trail impassable.

16 April 1944

Between 1500k and 1600k noticed P-38 Lightning, circling high above area. Visible at times through extremely thick clouds. From about 1600K until 1630K heard a plane diving at intervals, and at 1630K caught a glimpse of a B-24 Liberator, coming down in a straight dive. Passed from view behind hills and was heard to crash at 1630K. Judged plane to have gone down 2 to 3 miles from Tapen on 205° azimuth. Went out immediately with patrol and natives and search for plane. Forced back by darkness at 1800K. Notified G-2 of developments.

17 April 1944

Lt Baxter and WO Osborn with 6 natives followed Tapen-Windiluk trail to search side trails for plane or natives who saw it crash. Sent police with large party of natives to search cross country to point where plane was thought to have gone down. Met patrol returning from villages to E and SE. Negative report on Piper Cub. Returned to Tapen at 1715K. Native Kantor from Windiluk reported he had found two natives who heard plane crash.

18 April 1944

Departed early with patrol and 2 days rations to contact natives who heard plane crash. At 0830K cub came over and searched for plane, then departed. Found natives at Suwat (76.3 - 51.6). Observed burnt area on ridge at about (73.8 - 52.8). Natives verified this as direction plane was heard to crash. Weather closed in about noon.

19 April 1944

With native guides, followed bush trails up ridge to burnt area. At 0930K found first parts of plane, then bulk of plane, badly shattered and partially burned. Apparently plane came down with terrific force, as wings and fuselage were shattered, all four motors were torn out and wrecked, all guns were broken and twisted. I believe no occupant could have survived the crash there was no evidence that plane was occupied when it crashed. Plane in its location and condition is unfit for salvage. Plane was U S Army B-24, serial No 000. Returned to Tapen.

20-22 April 1944

Sent information into G-2 by radio. Notified natives of area to search for 8 or 10 airmen who might have come down by parachute, and if found to care for them and bring them to coast at Malalamai. On 21 April moved base from Tapen to Malalamai. On 22 April sent native patrol to Yagomi, Watang and Kepoiak and another to Kosit and Gabutamon, to try to gain information about crashed piper cub and to instruct natives regarding possible presence of airmen.

23 April 1944

Lt Baxter, WO Osborn and 2 natives while enroute to Yagomi met Iuluai of Gabutamon bringing in 1st Lt Truman T Henderson, who had parachuted from the Liberator and come down in the Yaut area. Took Henderson to Malalamai and sent Iuluai back to instruct all natives to search for airmen and bring them in.

24 April 1944

Visited Yagomi, natives knew of airmen information regarding piper cub negative. At about 1400K natives from Gabutamon brought in 1st Lt Carroll G Henry, S/Sgt John R Clayton and S/Sgt Ronald C Stein. Landed in Yaut area also, were weak and hungry but all right physically. PT boat arrived at 1530K, stood off and attempted to land rations by Ranger Boat. Raining hard and water very rough, gave instructions for PT boat to return and requested barge for next morning.

25 April 1944

Received additional supplies, SGR 193 in $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and Lt Lillie and 6 men as replacements. Sent four airmen, Cpl Lilly and Tec 5 Boschmann into Saidor. Received message from Lt Rae, Angau representative, that three airmen were down the coast in Roimui area. Lt Lillie and WO Osborn went to investigate.

26 April 1944

Lt Lillie and WO Osborn returned with 1st Lt Robert C Stone, Sgt Sharp and Sgt Richmond. Sharp landed in Nokapo area, Stone and Richmond came down in the Wadabo-Marawum area. Airmen returned to Saidor by barge.

27-29 April 1944

Took small patrol via Kosit and Gabutamon to Yaut which is small village of widely scattered huts occupied by Gabutamon bush natives. Approximate location Nankina sheet (66.0 - 53.5). Searched for remaining 3 airmen. (Lt Franklin, Sgts Egan and Picuci) and missing piper cub without success. Native runner brought message from Capt Bowles recalling entire patrol. Returned to Malalamai arriving at 1530K, 29 April. Lt Lillie and three men had departed, Tec 4 Clark was with me, Tec 4 Vermies and Pfc Srebro had been left to guard radio car and equipment. A patrol from the 126th Inf was on hand to relieve my patrol. Gave all possible information to leader of relief patrol, sent message requesting barge.

30 April - 2 May 1944

LCV came down 30 Apr 44 but was broached. No transportation arrived on 1 May and we were notified barges were not available. Lt Baxter and Tec 4 Clark walked along beach trail to Saidor arriving 1500K, 2 May 1944. Tec 4 Vermies and Pfc Srebro were left to guard equipment and were attached to 126th Inf patrol, returning to Saidor when this patrol was recalled.

EDWARD H BAXTER
1st Lt, Cavalry
Patrol Leader.

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

EWL/pww

EXHIBIT "D"

21 May 1944

PATROL REPORT

Reference Map: Seno East 1" equals 1 mile
Hauk East 1" equals 1 mile
Nanu West 1" equals 1 mile
Overlay

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL: One Officer and 25 EM from 3rd Platoon, 32d Reconnaissance Troop; one Angau Warrant Officer and 125 native carriers.
Leader: 1st Lt Edward W Londrigan.

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN: Departed 0745K 9 May 1944 and returned 1330K 20 May 1944.

3. MISSION: To reconnoiter trail approximately 25 miles directly south of Anamo and over Torricelli Mountain Range and to report any movement of enemy in that vicinity. To question natives concerning Jap operations and bivouacs in that area.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. Trail was passable from Palaura over Torricelli Range to Asier.
- b. A column of approximately 100 Japs with native guides had passed over track (refer to log 14 May 1944) three weeks previous to 15 May 1944. Reconnaissance patrol of 5 men were operating in vicinity of Wumerau three days previous to 16 May 1944.
- c. Trails south of Torricelli Range were in good condition and fairly well traveled. All villages in this area were situated on mountain tops, providing a good view of surrounding country.
- d. Natives were friendly, and we bartered with them for food for ourselves and the native carriers. They gave information readily on being questioned.
- e. Apprehended two natives who were working for Japanese as recruiters for native help and as native guides. These were turned over to Angau for questioning.
- f. Natives were willing to guide the patrol through mountain trails, and some volunteered to go to the coast with us to work as carriers, although most villages were depleted of able bodied men.
- g. For details and summary of results showing location and condition of tracks, streams, villages, and entire area covered by the patrol, refer to the annotated overlay sketch and log.

5. DETAILED REPORT: (See overlay and log of reconnaissance)
- a. Location and nature of native villages (see overlay and log)
 - b. Character of ground covered (see overlay and log)
 - c. Details of streams, crossings and other obstacles (refer to overlay and log).

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

EWL/fww

EXHIBIT "D", CONTD.

21 May 1944

LOG OF PATROL

9 May 1944:

One officer and 25 men from 3rd Platoon, 32d Reconnaissance Troop with 125 native carriers, departed Troop CP by vehicle at 0745K this day. Patrol to be out for 14 days. Arrived at end of vehicle road 0815K. There we dismounted and the natives adjusted rations and radio to be carried. Left IP (00.9 - 53.0) at 0900K. Arrived Chinapelli 1300K. Trail very swampy and muddy. Stopped for night at this point. Co "I", 127th Infantry outpost at Chinapelli. Contacted Angau WO to accompany patrol and to handle our natives and question local natives concerning activities of Japs in their own territory. Learned from Angau and 2 native police boys that the trail originally planned was blocked by landslide and to the best of our knowledge the only trail remaining to our objective was through the Kapoam villages and Yapunda. It was decided to take this trail after contacting CP.

10 May 1944:

Departed Chinapelli 0830K. Encountered very swampy and muddy trail. Reached objective of day, Kamti at 1800K (88.9 - 42.0) where we contacted outpost of 126th Infantry. Contacted Troop CP by radio and obtained permission to rest tomorrow. Men and natives were completely fatigued. Found 3 dead Japs and much enemy equipment along the trail.

11 May 1944:

After taking into consideration condition of men and natives and our mission it was decided to reduce the personnel of patrol and sacrifice strength for speed as we had lost at least 3 days march. It was decided to return 15 men and 27 natives who were not physically fit to continue. These men returned to Troop CP. This information was sent by radio to Troop CP. Preparations made to move out following day.

12 May 1944:

Departed from Kamti 0830K. In native huts and along trail in and around Paiwi found 8 dead Japs and killed 2. One of the dead Japs was an Officer. Of the 2 Japs killed, one in very bad condition. The other in fair condition. Were unarmed and carried only canteens, and cooking utensils. Paiwi had been heavily bombed and strafed. Continuing on the trail it was found to be in good condition for approximately 6 miles. After that we had to cross many streams and 2 rivers, the Nigia and the Lipan. The trail was very muddy over this distance. We bivouaced at (96.2 - 32.9), at a government rest house, arriving there at 1700K. Men and natives in good condition. At this point we found a dead Jap in an old Angau rest house. He was armed with a rifle and 30 rounds of ammunition. We contacted Troop CP by radio and gave them our destination for following day.

EXHIBIT "D", CONTD.

19 May 1944:

Departed Asier 0730K for Chinapelli. Encountered very mountainous terrain and swollen streams due to heavy rain. Arriving at Palaura 1700K. Contacted outpost of 127th Infantry. Continued on to Chinapelli, arriving at 1800K. Men and natives exceptionally tired.

20 May 1944:

Departed Chinapelli at 0900K. Angau, one police boy and several natives remained at Chinapelli awaiting arrival of native bearers with sick native who had fallen behind the previous day. Patrol continued to coast with native carriers. Arrived at (00.9 - 53.0) at 1230K. Picked up by vehicle and returned to Troop CP 1330K.

Foot noted:

Angau recruited approximately 50 natives on return trip, also picked up 2 Jap police boys (1 Major and 1 Captain) at Paitijomguila at (05.9 - 20.4) on 18 May 1944.

EDWARD W. LONDRIGAN
1st Lt Cavalry
Patrol Leader

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

EXHIBIT "E"

14 May 1944

PATROL REPORT

Reference Map: Aitape East Sheet, 1248, NE New Guinea.
1" equals 1 mile
Aitape West Sheet, 1248, NE New Guinea.
1" equals 1 mile.
Werre East Sheet, 1248, NE New Guinea.
1" equals 1 mile

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL: Security patrol, 1 Captain, Angau, 1 NCO and five EM, 32d Recon Tr. Patrol leader: Cpl Muriel T Pitcox.
2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN: Departed Angau 1030k, 9 May 1944. Returned to Angau 1800k, 13 May 1944.
3. MISSION: Security Patrol for Angau. Mission of Angau, to obtain native carriers.
4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED: Angau obtained approximately 200 carriers. Patrol found the trails and villages shown on map, were fairly accurate, with exception of Warapu village.
5. DETAILED REPORT:
 - a. 9 May 1944 - Patrol went by truck to Aitape. Left Aitape at 1120k and arrived village (87.2 - 55.9) at 1230k. Found abandoned Jap radio batteries and documents, which have been turned in to the Field Security. Proceeded Marok village arriving 1700k where patrol spent the night.
 - b. 10 May 1944 - Patrol left Marok village 0800k. Found two dead Japs apparently suicides, in Malol village. Arrived Arop village 1600k, spending the night here.
 - c. 11 May 1944 - Patrol left Arop village 0730k, via canoe across Sissano lagoon. Disembarked Warapu village, believed to be at (60.0 - 66.8). Patrol found sunken Jap barge at (59.5 - 62.2). Cargo had been unloaded by Japs and consisted of approximately 70 cases 18.5 A.P. ammunition, 50 gallons motor oil, 6 cases of unknown type rocket shells, and storage batteries. Batteries were carried to Serra village by the patrol. Patrol arrived Sissano village 1630k. ~~This was~~ and spent the night there.
 - d. 12 May 1944 - Patrol left Sissano village 0930k. Proceeded to Serra village arriving 1300k. This was objective of patrol and we stopped there.
 - e. 13 May 1944 - Left Serra at 1400k by barge and arrived angau at 1800k. Returned to troop CP 1900k.

S E C R E T

6. CONDITION OF PATROL ON RETURN: Patrol was in good physical condition on return.

7. COMMENTS: The patrol observed no sign of any Jap occupancy over long periods of time, but did see signs leading them to believe that the Japs were constantly moving through this territory, before the landing of this task force. All villages from this route had been flooded with Japanese invasion currency and it is recommended that all patrols that enter this area be instructed to point out the fact that the money is worthless.

MURIEL T PITCOX
Cpl, 32d Ren Tr

EXHIBIT "E", CONTD.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 32d INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the AC of S, G-2
APO 32

EXHIBIT "F"

16 July 1944

Patrol Order No. 1

Maps: 1" = 4 mi AITAPE and WENAK sheets, attached overlay.

1. Information:

a. Japanese troops in strength are attacking our forward elements along the DRINIUMOR RIVER. Enemy may attack from the east with only part of his force and attack AITAPE from the south and west by moving forces through foothills or south of the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS. If his attack from the east fails, the remnants may cross the mountains and utilize escape routes to the west to by-pass AITAPE.

b. Our forces continued to hold ANAMO and APUA. AIB parties will generally cover the area south of an east-west line through SALATA. Forward elements will cover the area from the coast south to the TORRICELLIS.

2. Missions for patrols: See overlay.

a. 2d Lt. Barnard's patrol is to establish a base sufficiently close to the MATAPAU-SALATA trail to enable him to submit any information of a Jap movement on that trail on the same day that the movement is sighted.

b. Capt Boettcher's patrol is to base in the vicinity of TONG and report information of Jap movements in the surrounding area.

c. 1st Lt. Baxter's patrol is to base in the vicinity of YAPUNDA and report information of Jap movements in the surrounding area.

d. 1st Lt. Lillie's patrol, based in the vicinity of LUMI is to report information of Jap movements in the surrounding area.

x. (1) Areas assigned on overlay are not patrol boundaries. Areas assigned are merely areas of responsibility. In following Jap movements both AIB patrols and our patrols are expected to keep contact regardless of area of responsibility.

(2) Patrol base may be moved if a more convenient center is located to gather information.

(3) Patrol leader, Angau Officer, and radio are to be kept together as much as possible to facilitate coordination, interpretation, and speed of transmission of information.

S E C R E T

EXHIBIT "F", CONTD.

(4) Patrols will guard against Japs coming south over mountains by posting sentries on trails up the DANDRIWAD RIVER, the DRINDARIA RIVER, the HARECH RIVER, and the DRINIUMOR RIVER and any other likely routes over the mountains.

4. Administration:

a. Supply will be by air dropping. Sufficient rations will be kept on hand to be able to move back to this base without an additional dropping. Rations/drops will be arranged by this Hq and level of native and white rations should be the same. Just report number of days rations on hand when requested. Except in emergencies, drops will not be more frequent than every five days.

b. Patrol leaders are in command and will require the complete cooperation and assistance of Angau officers.

c. Messages must be complete: i.e. where, when, what, why, who. Time of observation, size of force, and direction of movements are essential.

d. Ambushes of small Jap parties are authorized to gain information of enemy intentions and reactions or to capture documents.

5. Communication:

a. All radios will utilize the same code.

b. Radio messages will be sent in as early in the days as possible. Transmission after 1800K is difficult.

c. Daily reports of enemy activities required.

d. Reports of enemy activities have priority over all other messages.

e. All messages from NOS to any one patrol are to be intercepted by all patrols and decoded.

"TRUE COPY"

s/Robert S Ferguson
ROBERT S FERGUSON
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst AC of S, G-2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

BJL/fww

EXHIBIT "G"

12 August 1944

PATROL REPORT

Reference Maps: Aitape East 1" equals 1 mile
Aitape West 1" equals 1 mile
Hauk East 1" equals 1 mile
Hauk West 1" equals 1 mile
Seno East 1" equals 1 mile
Seno West 1" equals 1 mile

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL.

- a. Leader of Patrol: 1st Lt Bernard J Lillis, assistant patrol leader - Sgt C Schirack.
- b. Size of patrol:
 - (1) One Officer and twenty EM from 32d Reconnaissance Troop.
 - (2) Two EM from 107th Medical Battalion as aid men.
 - (3) One Angau Officer and four native police boys.
 - (4) Ninety-seven native carriers.
- c. Communications:
 - (1) One 284 radio (two operators).
 - (2) One M209 converter
 - (3) One set ground panels.
 - (4) Native runners.
- d. Supply:
 - (1) Individual equipment and seven days supply of food, (White and native food).
 - (2) All subsequent requirements were dropped by plane.

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN:

- a. Departed Angau (Aitape East 92.3 - 52.7) 0800K, 24 June 1944.
- b. Returned Tadjil (Aitape East 93.6 - 52.0) 1300K, 9 August 1944.
- c. Estimated duration of patrol - One month.

3. MISSIONS:

- a. To proceed to Lumi (55.5 - 16.0) by way of Wom, Mt Somero, Wilbeiti and Sigaite.
- b. To establish and hold a base at Lumi.
- c. To patrol and report any enemy activity in the area roughly bounded by Lumi, Mt Somero and Ningal.
- d. To find out if the old commercial air strip at Lumi could be enlarged to land an army transport plane.
- e. Mission changed to include ambushes or small scale attacks on enemy for the purpose of capturing equipment for identification and to test their reaction to such attacks.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. Arrived at Lumi in four days without incident.
- b. Established a base at Lumi and sent native police and cargo boys to surrounding villages to obtain information.
- c. Called all officials of villages in the area to Lumi and explained our purpose of being there and what we wanted them to do in regards to enemy.
- d. Contacted AIB patrol officer Stanley and obtained all information from him in regards to enemy and natives.
- e. Left Lumi with eight men and one Angau Officer and Capt O'Donnel and went to Yamnu via Fongom, Ondrame, Pingil, Nakie and Wititai. Talked with Patrol Officer Stanley and proceeded to Wuhlagil via Piem, Yili and Mambel. Set up an ambush at Wuhlagil to hit enemy patrols working in that area. Held ambush for 48 hours without results and returned to Lumi via Yingeua, Mabul, Karate and Sabote.
- f. Capt O'Donnel and four men went to Minatei and set up ambush for hitting enemy patrols in that area. Their position held for 20 hours at which time enemy attacked them, guided by local natives of Yongitei who knew of his position. He wounded several and withdrew from the village and returned to Lumi next day.
- g. Moved base to Aoeti as Lumi was not secure enough position and water was too far from position.
- h. Received ten men as replacements for men returned to Tadji by piper cub plane, who were sick.
- i. Received orders I was to be relieved by reconnaissance patrol from 43d Division.
- j. 43d Division patrol arrived Aoeti with native carriers and five more native police to help in patrol work.

5. REPORT OF AMBUSH ON RETURN TRIP:

- a. Left Aoeti at 0800K, 7 August 1944 with 24 white men and 97 cargo natives plus four native prisoners and two police boys.
- b. Capt O'Donnel, Angau, instructed me to take the natives to Angau base without the help of any Angau overseers as he needed him to handle the natives in the field.
- c. The order for my return received from G-2, did not include orders for Capt O'Donnel or WO Lyons also of Angau who came to Aoeti with replacements.
- d. I proceeded to Silbaite meeting in route several natives who tried to tell me of enemy activity but I was unable to clearly understand them. A native runner caught me at Sibaite with a message from Capt O'Donnel, informing me the enemy had moved during the night from Yongiti up to the head waters of the Gwenif River, but he didn't know if it was the right or left branch. I receipted the message and at the same time received some secret papers from Stanley addressed to Task Force Hqs. I informed the men of the enemy position and instructed them to be careful of ambush and tried to explain the situation to a native police boy who was leading us. We proceeded to Mulfuf where we contacted some village officials who told us enemy was in village of Rauwetei and they were four strong. The native police boy talked to these officials and we moved to Rauwetei with a strong point, a safe distance ahead of the carrier line. On arrival we scouted the village but found no enemy. We did see evidence of their presence.

5. REPORT OF AMBUS. ON RETURN TRIP (CONTINUED):

d. We met another village official who told us he had come from Wilbuti and enemy was not present there. With native officials leading us, we proceeded to Wilbuti arriving there at 1240K. As I came up the trail to the rest house I noticed several natives sitting around and sent one for the officials of the village as I had planned to remain there for the night. I stopped the column for a rest and called my assistant, Sgt Schirack back from the lead to inquire his opinion of going along to Mt Somero as it was still early in the day. As we stood talking of this matter I turned toward the village, as a native ran from the vicinity of the rest house and saw an enemy rifleman standing about fifteen yards to my front in the open. He did not fire but I fired at him. He fell to the ground and I noticed later he remained in the same position, at the same time two machine guns and several rifles opened up on us. Several of the men on hearing the first shots had taken up positions where they could fire on the enemy and I instructed my Sgt and several more men to try to round up the native cargo boys and pick up our equipment. The cargo boys dropped their loads and were running in all directions. The trail at this point runs along the side and below the crest of a rather steep hill, the enemy being on top of the hill and back from the edge about twenty five or thirty five yards. My men were along the edge of the hill and above the trail so there was very little danger of natives or whites being hit. With everyone's help and after much confusion and quite a long lapse of time, we managed to pick up all the cargo visible and send the natives up the trail toward Mt Somero with several of my men and my Sgt who I instructed to go up the trail and assemble the cargo line. Dividing my time between the fire fight and the collecting of cargo, I was unaware of the fact that several of the cargo boys and seven of my men had turned back on the trail and never reached the scene of the ambush. The enemy was at this time starting to use hand grenades and the men I had present had no cover but were out in the open. I ordered them to draw up the trail and protect the rear of the column. They did this and as we left the area we checked the ground and area along the trail for cargo. We found several packs and the 284 Radio receiver and transmitter assembly. I noticed it had bullet holes in it and as the enemy was still firing at us and we had not any cover, two of the men took the radio up the trail and destroyed it beyond repair. We then withdrew up the trail to the village of Mau expecting to find the rest of the men and equipment there, but did not catch up with the rest until we reached Mt Somero late in the afternoon. We found 39 native cargo boys but no cargo along the trail and I then learned the cargo boys present had thrown away all their equipment and food and I could not understand or make them understand me enough to find out where. I also learned that seven of my men and about 40 cargo boys were missing. I felt that they must have returned to Capt O'Donnell at Oati or were traveling around by bush trails to Tadjil as they weren't present at the scene of ambush when we left. Due to the fact we had no food I ordered a guard posted for the night and decided to return to Hdq as soon as possible. We left Mt Somero and spent the next night at Malol on the coast and returned to Tadjil at 1300K 9 August 1944. I learned on arrival the seven men had returned to Oati.

6. COMMENTS:

- a. A patrol should not be sent out on any occasion without Angau personnel to take care of the natives. In my opinion our Troops are not qualified to handle natives.

BERNARD J LILLIE
1st Lt Cavalry
Patrol Leader

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

EXHIBIT "H"

4 August 1944

PATROL REPORT

Reference Maps: Seno East 1" equals 1 mile.
Aitape East 1" equals 1 mile.
Suain West 1" equals 1 mile.
Suain East 1" equals 1 mile.
Nanie West 1" equals 1 mile.

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL:

- a. One Officer and nine EM from 3d Platoon, 32d Reconnaissance Troop; two Angau Officer, seventy natives and eight Police Boys.
Patrol Leader: 2d Lt James E Barnard.
- b. Communications consisted of one 284 radio, five panels and local native runners.
- c. Supply was by air after initial fourteen days rations were consumed.

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN: Departed Angau 26 June 1944; returned to Angau 2 August 1944.

3. MISSIONS:

- a. To proceed by best route to vicinity of (43.5 - 31.0) and establish two observation posts and observe location, strength, movement of enemy.
- b. To return to above observation post areas and observe and additional four days, which was later cancelled.
- c. To proceed by best route to Danmap River (57.0 - 26.0) and establish observation post to observe movement along river and on east bank.
- d. To establish a observation post near Walum and report movements of enemy on Salata, Womisis, Walum and Malin Road. Later cancelled.
- e. To establish a observation post on Drinimor River (18.5 - 21.0) and watch Jap movement across river.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. The mission to vicinity of Deia Creek (43.5 - 31.0) disclosed Jap bivouac area, new track along foot of hills, apparent lack of food, due to shooting of wild fowl; one vehicle along beach and numerous smoke fires in flat land area were also seen.
- b. The mission to Danmap River Area disclosed mostly negative information. Two Japs were seen and ten pro-Jap natives. An old, well used track was found running through Balop. Frequent rifle shots were heard.
- c. Mission to the Drinimor River disclosed recent Jap patrol to river junction (20.4 - 27.3). No Jap movement along river down to (19.0 - 31.0). This area unsuitable for out post with a base so far south.
- d. Several new tracks were found and used. Confirmation of non-existent villages was secured from natives for benefit of improving maps.

Detailed Report (continued)

The movement back was accomplished with no unusual events.

During the entire patrol we had the willing cooperation of the local natives. They have sentries established along all main trails and on the head waters of all the rivers which run into the coast. They will provide you with guides, carriers (for four or five men) and will sell you food. You could not operate in this area without native guides. They can show you short-cut routes which save hours and avoid mountains.

6. CONDITION OF PATROL ON RETURN: The men were very tired, but suffered no ill effects which good food and rest will not cure.

7. COMMENTS:

- a. Give patrol leader definite and logical missions to perform. Lack of understanding results from frequent change of orders and unimportant missions. The terrain is too difficult to fool around and travel here and there for nothing gained.
- b. Permit patrol leader to run his patrol as he sees fit - give him a mission to do and let him do it without restrictions.
- c. Keep patrol informed of situation and location of enemy and friendly troops. This would help to avoid double coverage of territory and give patrol sense of security, prevent over cautiousness and help their morale considerably.
- d. Patrol should be informed as to length of time out, which should not be more than five weeks. Then proper and necessary amount of equipment can be taken: 3 pair of shoes should be taken, plenty of socks, medical supplies, good wholesome food and other items necessary for comfort of men in mountains.
- e. Consolidation of information gained from these long patrols should be made and published for the benefit of other long range patrols. If the patrol gets started off in the right path to begin with, proper equipment, proper instructions, hints and advice from experienced patrol men (which includes very valuable Angau men) they will perform a good job.
- f. Only the best men should be taken on these patrols. Men in good health and mental condition. With proper care and observation by patrol leader the men will not get sick and can go on with their work efficiently.
- g. A strong force of good men and officers should be located at Tong or vicinity with the mission of harassing the Japs in the area. Small combat patrols could sneak over the mountains and cause much confusion in the Jap rear areas. They could also block any movement up the river by establishing ambushes. The rivers are suitable for excellent ambushes. These raids could be carried out easily by use of native guides and aggressive men. I believe it would help disorganize the Japs, create anxiety and make them conscious of our might; ambushing small parties of Japs reported by natives would strengthen our prestige among the natives. Frequent use of patrol planes over this area will also help, by scaring Japs in to bush and impressing natives that we are watching this area closely. No bombing is necessary to put respect for our planes into the natives and small Jap parties.

JAMES E BARNARD
2nd Lt Cavalry
Patrol Leader

5. DETAILED REPORT Patrol left Aitape Area on 26 June 1944, traveled by LOM to Anemo. Proceeded by foot inland via best route to (44.7 - 23.8) and established base. From there six men and myself were guided by local natives to a small village, Nugulsum (43.4 - 31.0). Three men proceeded down a small trail to 43.1 - 33.1 and found a small enemy bivouac area, estimated strength, two platoons. Lean to huts were built and area was cleared of under brush. Japs were resting, cooking and moving about in this area. Considerable chopping and pounding was heard in area out of observation of out post. Two men and myself proceeded down a small ridge trail to (44.2 - 31.9) and discovered a large bivouac area estimated to hold two companies. Twelve large lean to huts could be seen with indications of more in area out of observation. These huts were occupied and other Japs in the area were carrying on various duties, ie cooking, cleaning rifles and washing. A large eight foot road could be seen at base of ridge running east and west. Over a period of two days forty seven Japs were observed moving west on this road; they were armed and carried packs. Several small parties moved to and fro on road, some around, others with no arms or equipment. No vehicles or heavy weapons were seen during our observation, although I believe the road could have carried a light vehicle. From the village which was on a hill tip, the beach track could be seen, but during the day no large movement was seen. Two Japs were seen cutting wood near a hut. The flat coast area between mountains and beach could be seen and numerous smoke fires were seen just at dusk each night. Twice a bright light was seen moving along the beach; it appeared to be a light on a vehicle. During the day frequent rifle shots were heard indicating shooting of wild fowl. Patrol returned to base.

I moved to Nibet and rested a day, then moved to Mokuir where I set up a base. My new mission was to go to (57.4 - 23.7) and establish an out post and watch the Dammap River. I was guided by an excellent native to this out post. From it we could see over a 1000 yards stretch of river bed and a vast area in the valley including the village of Balup (57.4 - 25.4). We observed for two days and saw very little. Two Japs were seen going south through Balup. They had no packs. Two men and myself went into Balup but encountered no Japs. The village had been used and the track through it was well worn, but no Japs. No recent tracks were seen other than the two previously mentioned. No other movement was observed along the river, no fires or light. Infrequent rifle shots were heard. The route to this out post was one of the most difficult I encountered; the terrain is very rough. The terrain on the first mission was equally as rough. It took all the strength from you to climb the mountains. I returned to my base at Mokuir.

From Mokuir I went to Tong and rested there. I received more supplies and awaited further instructions. Capt Bottcher arrived and took over Lt Pascoe's mission. My next move was to the Driniumar River area to establish an out post at (18.5 - 32.5) and to watch enemy crossings of the river. I moved to a village, Kuinyong (23.2 - 21.8) and established my base. Four men and myself went down the river to 20.4 - 27.3 and found recent tracks (one day old) of six man Jap patrol. Found huts used by Japs and observed that they were eating roots and leaves that natives shun for food. Went on down river, then on a trail on east side to a point (20.0 - 29.5) and built two huts. From there I patrolled north to go across country. The only movement possible is to use river canyon. I had a ridge selected from my study on the terrain, for an out post at 18.9 - 31.3). Approach to this out post was up a very steep mountain side. The area here was not suitable for a out post due to long line of supply and communication and artillery fire, in this area, making it equally unsuitable. The river flooded while we were down there and upon trying to return after our four days, one man was almost drowned. Orders came for my return to Yapunda, thence to Aitape.

43

C O N F I D E N T I A L

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

RLS/tww

EXHIBIT "K"

12 August 1944

PATROL REPORT

Reference Maps: Wewak 1" equals 4 miles
Aitape 1" equals 4 miles
Aitape East 1" equals 1 mile
Seno East 1" equals 1 mile
Seno West 1" equals 1 mile
Suain East 1" equals 1 mile
Suain West 1" equals 1 mile
Hauk East 1" equals 1 mile
Namu East 1" equals 1 mile
Namu West 1" equals 1 mile

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL:

- a. Patrol Leader, 2d Lt Royale L Steele and 2nd Lt Louis J Wartham, assistant patrol leader.
- b. Nineteen EM from 32d Reconnaissance Troop.
- c. One Angau Officer and two police boys.
- d. Fifty native carriers
- e. One 284 radio and panels to be picked up at Yapanda.
- f. Supply by air after initial three days ration consumed.

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN:

- a. Departed Angau 8 August 1944.
- b. Returned to Angau 9 August 1944.

3. MISSIONS:

- a. Area of responsibility: Nunsu, Winbe, Asier, Kuimbart, Mup, Sela, and Mai.
- b. Reconnoiter Dandrewad, Dandamain, Harech, Driniumor and Asier Passes.
- c. Observe enemy at Winbe, Yuwil, Walem, and Yerisi. Report movements.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. None

5. DETAILED REPORT:

- a. Mission cancelled 1900K, 8 August 1944 while patrol was at Kamti.

6. CONDITION OF PATROL ON RETURN:

- a. Men very fatigued.

32d RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
APO 32, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco California

HJB/fww

10 August 1944

EXHIBIT "J"

PATROL REPORT

Reference Maps: Aitape East 1" equals 1 mile.
Aitape West 1" equals 1 mile.
Suain East 1" equals 1 mile.
Seno East 1" equals 1 mile.
Suain West 1" equals 1 mile.
Seno West 1" equals 1 mile.
Nanu East 1" equals 1 mile.
Nanu West 1" equals 1 mile.
Hauk East 1" equals 1 mile.
Overlay.

1. DESIGNATION AND SIZE OF PATROL:

- a. Patrol Leader:
 - (1) Capt Herman J Bottcher.
 - (2) Sgt Ralph F Miller, Asst Patrol Leader.
- b. Size of patrol:
 - (1) One Officer and fourteen EM, 32d Reconnaissance Troop.
 - (2) Two EM as aid men from 107th Medical Battalion.
 - (3) One Angau Officer and four native police boys.
 - (4) Fifty-six native carriers.
- c. Communications:
 - (1) One 284 Radio (two operators)
 - (2) Two M209 converters.
 - (3) Two sets ground panels.
 - (4) Two signal flags.
 - (5) Native runners.
- d. Supply:
 - (1) Initial equipment and six days supplies carried.
 - (2) All subsequent requirements dropped by plane (O-47)
- e. Armament:
 - (1) Eight Thompson Sub Machine Guns, 20 rounds ammunition each.
 - (2) Seven Carbines, 75 rounds ammunition each.
 - (3) Two M-1 Rifles, with grenade launchers, 80 rounds each.
 - (4) Ten grenade adapters.
 - (5) Two hand grenades per man.
 - (6) Five compasses.
 - (7) Two pair binoculars.
 - (8) Machetes and entrenching tools.
- f. Rations and individual equipment:
 - (1) Rations consisted of 10 and 1, supplemented by J, K, and D rations plus whatever native food could be bought.
 - (2) Each jungle pack contained:
 - (a) One hammock.
 - (b) One blanket.
 - (c) One Poncho.
 - (d) One set underwear
 - (e) One pair HBT trousers.
 - (f) One jungle sweater.
 - (g) Two pairs socks.
 - (h) One pair jungle boots.
 - (i) Toilet articles.

EXHIBIT "J", CONTD.

f. Rations and individual equipment (continued)

(3) First aid pack contained:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|
| (a) Iodine. | (e) Salt tablets. |
| (b) Insect repellent. | (f) Sulfa drugs. |
| (c) Atabrine. | (g) Bandages. |
| (d) Halasone tablets. | |

2. TIME OF DEPARTURE AND RETURN:

- a. Departed Angau (Aitape East 92.3 - 52.7) 10 July 1944, 0800k.
- b. Returned Tadjji (Aitape East 95.6 - 52.0) 7 August 1944, 1430k.
- c. Estimated duration of patrol - one month.

3. MISSIONS:

- a. To proceed by best route to Tong, (Nanu West) and relieve Lt Pasco and patrol (Reconn Co, 632 TD).
- b. To patrol area roughly bounded by the following grid lines: East, 58.0 - West, 16.0 - North, 22.0 - South, 00.0.
- c. To post sentries at the headquarters of the Dandriwad, Harech and Driniumar Rivers.
- d. To place native scouts and agents in surrounding villages to gather enemy information.
- e. To report all enemy movements and activities immediately.
- f. To contact Capt Fryer's patrol A.L.B. somewhere south and coordinate activities of patrols.
- g. Mission changed to include in patrol area vicinity of Kombio villages, Miyet, Lambuain, Makfir, Walum and Wamisis (Suain East): Lt Barnard to take over patrol of Harech, Driniumar sector.
- h. Mission changed to evacuate Tong and establish base at Yapunda Seno East) and again to include Harech and Driniumar in patrol area.
- i. Mission changed to include entire Lt Baxter patrol consisting of one Officer and 27 EM, one Angau Officer, six native police boys and 80 natives as carriers.
- j. New mission to include the entire area formerly patrolled by Lt Baxter, Lt Barnard, and Capt Bottcher patrols, the boundaries of which are roughly as follows: North 26.0 - East 58.0 - West 84.0 - South 00.0.
- k. Ordered by Commanding General to return to Aitape immediately and Lt Baxter to take over entire patrol.

4. RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED:

- a. Relief of Lt Pasco patrol accomplished without incident.
- b. Established system whereby native scouts and agents had to report regularly even when report negative.
- c. Spot checked natives sentry posts and information.
- d. Relayed all information received promptly to G-2 via radio.
- e. Met Capt Fryer's patrol near Musendai (Nanu East) resulting in exchange of valuable information regarding enemy activities, possible escape routes, native food supply, attitude of natives, terrain features, revision of portions of map, trains, possible E.L.G. for piper cubs, dropping grounds, possibility of recruiting native labor if needed etc.

5. CONDITION ON PATROL ON RETURN:

- a. No men fell sick, but all were very tired. A short rest and a cleaning up plus new equipment will put the men into top shape.

6. COMMENTS:

- a. Give patrol a definite mission; frequent changes of orders on important missions should be avoided. Terrain is much too difficult to traverse. Undue interference by persons not familiar with terrain, enemy situation, supply, etc, tends to confuse and lowers prestige of patrol leader.
- b. Men should be picked for physical fitness and mental attitude. Sickness might jeopardize success of patrol.
- c. All men should be informed of changes in missions, enemy situation etc. Extra maps should be made available.
- d. Men should be instructed in bush craft. A good bushman is a good patrol man.
- e. Possibly a reenforced company should be placed in some central base south of Asier. Cub strip could be built near there, to facilitate communication and possible evacuation of casualties. The passes over Torricilli from Danmap, Dandriwad, Dandanain, Yarecy, Driniumor, and Lipan Passes have been excellent ambush position, from which enemy could be stopped coming across mountains.
- f. Small reconnaissance patrols consisting of not more than five men of which one must know Pidgin, could be sent from base. Equipment: T.S.M.G., M-3, radio and hand grenades.
- g. Reconnaissance combat patrol should include M-1 rifle and grenade launchers, possibly B.A.R.'s as well.
- h. All patrols should have besides regular field equipment, some .22 rifles or shotguns for hunting game to supplement food supply. SCR-300 series radio should be available because of light weight and long ranges. Various trade items such as razor blades, salt, paint, tobacco, old newspapers etc, to buy native food and labor.
- i. If raiding parties are considered advisable, demolitions, pyrotechnics, knives, bayonets, should be taken.

HERMAN J. BOTTOHER
Captain, Infantry
Commanding.

LOG OF PATROL

10 July 1944

Proceeded by truck to Angau Compound, 0800K; thence with complete equipment and carrier line via St Anna mission, across Raiyu River along Tadji, Kapdam track to Kamti (Aitape East), which was occupied by Co "K", 126th Inf. Arrived Kamti at 1430K and since road was extremely muddy and difficult to traverse, made camp for night.

11 July 1944

Started off at 0800K for Lipan pass (Seno East 97.5 - 31.8) house Kiap, which we reached without incident, At 1515K. Trail again extremely muddy and swampy, particularly in vicinity of Nigia and Lipan Rivers. Two guard posts established around camp, one by our men and one by native police.

12 July 1944

Moved 0730K along Lipan River, following stream bed for three hours, then steep climb over Torricelli divide and steep descent to Om River, which course we followed to Yapunda (Seno East 01.5 - 19.1). Lt Baxter's patrol stationed there. We arrived at 1400K and made camp.

13 July 1944

Left 0800K via Markumber, Paitjonguilla (possible cup strip site) and Anipo. Arrived 1500K at camp (Suain West 11.8 - 17.3) without incident.

14 July 1944

In order to lighten load and make better time, hired additional native labor; standard pay per day per carrier was one-half table spoon of salt or one shilling as directed by Angau. Started on trail 0740K. Itinerary for day Womap, Yapangel, Sundun (good dropping site), Imbarkan, Yakewor, to Yamokin (Seno East 18.5 - 13.9), (also good dropping site). Made camp at 1545K.

15 July 1944

Broke camp at 0725K. Followed route through Yanguai, Yanambum, Ringin, Tong (Hauk West 27.8 - 13.3), at which place we were to establish patrol base, arrived at 1330K.

16 July 1944

Relieved Lt Pasco's patrol and assumed control of base. Lt Barnard's carrier line stationed here. Capt Fulton, Angau to move his Base from Ringin to Tong.

17 July 1944

Lt Pasco's patrol left for Aitape. Native sentry from Kombio reports Japs in Charov and Anapaluk, robbing native gardens and pigs. Sentry from Lambuaim reports Japs at Malin, Balep, working sac sac. Prepared to meet Capt Fryer (A.I.B.).

18 July 1944

Patrol of one Officer, one Angau, three EM, four police boys and eighteen natives as carriers left 0800K, to meet Capt Fryer at Musendai (39.9 - 96.8). Natives report no enemy in area, so proceeded at good pace via Yambes, Musimbilin, (possible dropping ground) to Duman, where native scout from Fryer party intercepted us. He took us to A.I.B. camp at 34.6 - 02.5, Nanu East, where we met Fryer and party and stayed there for night. Position radioed to G-2.

19 July 1944

Combined Fryer, Bottcher patrols went to Miwyak, Musendai, Apos villages to Uruno, camped at 45.5 - 94.1, Nanu East. Sent out scouts to bring in native Timinger, Slaate area for interviews. 33 Japs reported at Balik villages, making sac sac.

5K

LOG OF PATROL (CONTINUED)

20 July 1944

Moved 0745K through Timinger, Ambum, Wombanor to 46.1 - 01.2, Nanu East. Natives very friendly and cooperative. Report 33 Japs at Bolif with radio which might be out of order. Two to five native police with Japs. Balif natives belt Japs as scouts and secure food for them.

21 July 1944

Planned to stay another day in area to contact natives and gather information. Visited Wora, Terawon, Albomim, Salata, Wahun, Saron to camp. Jap outposts reported on east bank of Nanu River, west of Balif. Decided not to attack Japs with small force at hand, as risks to great.

22 July 1944

Started enroute 0730K. Proceeded to Luwaite where native patrol turned north east via Bana, Selni Villages, Amil, Walende to meet us at Sumuc to-morrow. Rest of patrol to proceed via Emul, Pelnandu, Perambil villages to Sumul. No additional information of Japs. Trail from Perambil to Puzal, roughest yet encountered. Sumul excellent defensive position. Main road from Ulu Mission (coast) Dandriwad) passes here.

23 July 1944

From Sumul (excellent house kiap) via Yasum, Samark, Yakito to Tong, where we arrived 1315K. Supplies dropped at Tong.

24 July 1944

Patrol rested, no enemy information.

25 July 1944

Natives report Japs threaten to move south and west, when food supply at Walum runs low.

26 July 1944

Prepare five man patrol for six days. Patrol to move to Lambuanin, Makfir, Walum, Womisis, Amam, Hambin, Selni, Sumul to Tong. Mission canceled.

27 July 1944

Prepare patrol to move to head waters of Drimiumor, Harecy Rivers, later canceled.

28 July 1944

Ordered to evacuate Tong and establish base at Yapunda.

29 July 1944

Nothing of importance to report.

30 July 1944

Started to move entire camp to Yapunda. Had to have about 80 additional native carriers. Took native trail via Yakum, Soaiaf, Asor, Yamokin 18.5 - 13.9, Seno East. Camped for night.

31 July 1944

Arrived Yapangal without incident.

1 August 1944

Arrived Yapunda 1900K. Organized patrol to reconnoiter possible site for piper cub strip in Asier area (Seno East - Sumain West)

2 August 1944

Patrol rested.

3 August 1944

Organized new system of guarding base and outposts. Interviewed natives from Muku, Komu area to get information on Japs reported at Wimbe. Possibility of future attack considered.

4 August 1944

Base enlarged to take care of combined Baxter, Bottcher patrol of two officers, two Angau officer, 39 EM, 14 natives police boys and 180 native carriers.

LOG OF PATROL (CONTINUED)

5 August 1944

Patrol returned from Asier area to report possible cub strip site available near Paitjomguila. Site is 900 feet long, 300 feet wide, with no obstruction on either end. Would take 50 to 75 natives one week with axes, picks, shovels to build. Site excellent for base and defense for larger force. Capt Bottcher ordered to return to Aitape immediately by Commanding General, 11th Corps for consultation. Lt Gow, Angau, ordered to return to Aitape.

6 August 1944

Left Yapunda 0730K, arrived House Kiap 1430K. Due to heavy rain storm, made camp.

7 August 1944

Left House Kiap, 0645K with one native police boy. Arrived Kamti 100K. Trail extremely muddy. After muddy trip, arrived Tadji Plantation House 1430K.

HERMAN J BOTTCHER
Captain, Infantry
Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH A.C.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM 1M3-867 PENTAGON

32d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP MECHANIZED

32d INFANTRY DIVISION

AFQ 32

LEYTE ISLAND, CENTRAL PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN

U-N-I-T H-I-S-T-O-R-I-C-A-L R-E-P-O-R-T

TO
THE COMMANDING GENERAL
32d INFANTRY DIVISION

AFQ 32

SUBMITTED 12 JANUARY 1946

32d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP MECHANIZED
32d Infantry Division
APO 32

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Historical Report

TO : Adjutant General, APO 32

INTRODUCTION

1. Herein is presented a concise, chronological narrative of the accomplishments and experience of the 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized, thruout the period of its participation in the Leyte campaign, 17 Nov 44 to 2 Jan 45 inclusive.

2. To enumerate each and every occurrence would entail a listing of endless routine reports of the movement of small enemy groups and other daily occurrences, and would tend to obscure the real substance of this report.

3. In addition to minor firefights, casualties suffered, and prisoners of war taken during the campaign are reported herein. All captured documents, identifications and enemy equipment were promptly forwarded to headquarters.

4. The primary mission of each patrol was to obtain information of the enemy, ie, movement, disposition, composition, time and location. In addition, several or all of the following missions were incorporated in each patrol order. To capture prisoners of war; to observe terrain, topography and trail nets; to submit corrective sketches for maps in use.

5. Re-supply was accomplished for the most part, by supply trains. Three emergency sub drops were received.

6. Valuable knowledge and experience was gained primarily in dealings with civilians, including pro-Japanese, and with the guerilla forces thruout the campaign.

332-CAY-03-Unit Hist Rpt - Leyte - 32nd Cav Recon Troop - 17 Nov 44 - 2 Jan 45
32nd Inf Div - 17 Nov 44 - 2 Jan 45
7818

L-E-Y-T-E C-A-N-P-A-I-G-N

14 - 17 Nov 44 inclusive.

Upon arrival from Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea on 14 Nov 44, the troop debarked at Palo, Leyte, and proceeded to a temporary troop area at San Mateo.

On 16 Nov 44, the troop moved forward to an area below Pinamapoan. Captain Bottcher alerted the 1st and 2d platoons for a mission.

The troop strength at this time was 6 officers and 135 enlisted men. Headquarters, 1st and 2d platoons dismounted. 3d platoon mounted in LVT's and situated, temporarily, at San Mateo.

18 - 19 Nov 44 inclusive.

On 18 Nov 44, Captain Bottcher, Lt Steele and 56 enlisted men departed on an island reconnaissance mission.

20 - 30 Nov 44 inclusive.

Captain Bottcher's patrol reached Agayayan on 20 Nov 44 and established a CP. The same day, at about 1530I Tec 5 Harry A Hildreth was accidentally killed by a hand grenade which exploded in his pocket. S/Sgt Leamon J Gagle was slightly wounded.

On 24 Nov 44, a twenty-four hour observation post was established on the high ground immediately W of Cananga. This particular CP was ideally situated. The left flank offered good possibilities for ambushing small enemy groups. Subsequently, several prisoners were taken at this position. In addition, several were wounded and two were killed.

On 29 Nov 44, two prisoners were taken in the Loney-Cananga area.

1 - 5 Dec 44 inclusive

Captain Bottcher's patrol contacted enemy E of Matagob on 1 Dec 44. Tec 5 Walter R Koschmann slightly grazed by enemy fire. The patrol had to withdraw from their position when one IMG and one mortar squad opposed them frontally, while one on each side tried to outflank them. This patrol destroyed many bridges by chopping and burning during the course of their mission.

On 2 Dec 44, the Cananga CP had a slight firefight on the left flank and killed one enemy soldier. He possessed no documents or other information except one identification tag.

Captain Bottcher's patrol had firefight with enemy squad near Matagob on 3 Dec 44. Inflicted three casualties on enemy and killed two. Captured one POW who died of wounds received.

The same day, Lt Steele had one civilian held for questioning by guerillas. He appeared to be much too inquisitive as to all transmissions, maps, weapons and troops. Subsequently he proved to be harmless.

The patrol base CP was moved to Taygaytay early 3 Dec 44.

On 4 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher's patrol had a firefight with an enemy outpost. One of the Captain's guerillas was killed.

On 5 Dec 44, Lt Steele lead a raid on an enemy foraging party. Sighted four killed and three wounded. The following day natives reported at least fifteen enemy killed. Estimated enemy strength thirty to forty. One guerilla with Lt Steele's patrol was killed.

6 - 10 Dec 44 inclusive.

Many enemy patrols in vicinity of Taygaytay CP.

The base CP was moved back to Agayayan.

Two POW's were taken on left flank of Cananga CP.

On 8 Dec 44, one POW was taken in the Lonoy area.

Firefight on the left flank of Cananga CP with about eight of the enemy. One of the enemy badly wounded but carried away.

11 - 20 Dec 44 inclusive

On 11 Dec 44, one enemy soldier was killed 300 yards E of base CP at Agayayan. Possessed documents and was well armed.

On 15 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher's supply train contacted the enemy at 1200I and 1630I. The supply route had become more difficult to maintain.

At 1800I, 15 Dec 44, fifty to sixty enemy soldiers attacked the Agayayan CP. They were well armed and possessed one LMG. Captain Bottcher's patrol of one officer and 22 enlisted men put up the stand and during the night withdrew to a new CP about two kilometres SW. The enemy was engaged with small arms, LMG and mortars. The CP suffered one light casualty.

Prior to the firefight, two Japanese had approached the CP unknowingly. Captain Bottcher attempted to capture them. One killed himself with a grenade. The other gave himself up only after being severely wounded. He died during the encounter that evening.

On 16 Dec 44, the Cananga CP was attacked by the enemy and our patrol was pushed out of its position.

taken

The same day, two prisoners were taken at 1700I.

In addition, a strong patrol was sent back to the former CP and chased the enemy from the vicinity of Agayayan. All equipment recovered plus one enemy LMG and several grenades. The Cananga CP was reestablished by Lt Steele's patrol on 17 Dec 44.

On 18 Dec 44, the Gananga outpost had a slight firefight at dawn. No casualties. Two prisoners, seriously wounded, were captured and started to the rear.

Lt Wortham's patrol engaged in small firefight. No casualties sustained.

S/Sgt Donald H Aney arrived with his party and reported contact with the enemy on 17 Dec 44. Three enemy soldiers killed.

At 1200I, 20 Dec 44, five Japanese were killed 300 yards W of CP. They would not surrender.

One prisoner was taken. Later proved to be a Japanese artillery captain. The highest ranking prisoner of war taken during the Leyte campaign.

Lt Wortham's patrol killed one Japanese in vicinity of old CP at Agayayan.

21 - 29 Dec inclusive.

21 Dec 44, three Japanese were killed 500 yards N of CP, ant Tec 5 William A Inman was slightly wounded.

Same day Lt Wortham's patrol killed three Japanese.

On 22 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher left the CP with Lt Steele for new base. Lt Williams and Lt Richert plus 35 enlisted men left behind to bring up supplies the following day. The rest of the personnel accompanied the Captain.

The same day another prisoner was taken at the old CP. At 1845I the CP was evacuated to a position approximately one thousand yards SE due to large enemy groups moving S towards CP.

On 23 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher's patrol arrived at Mataroto. The entire movement had been delayed due to necessity of skirting large enemy groups moving S.

One POW was captured at Mambahao by Lt Wortham's patrol on 24 Dec 44.

A small enemy patrol approached CP on 25 Dec 44. They were chased off. The CP was moved approximately one thousand yards N in order to avoid a larger engagement.

On 25 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher's patrol reached its destination and contacted Lt Wortham's patrol and established a CP at Mambahao.

on 28 Dec 44, Captain Bottcher joined Lt Steele's patrol at the Silad CP.

The CP being too close to the Division S boundry, it was moved approximately fifteen hundred yards to the ENE.

on 29 Dec 44, one Japanese came to the CP with surrender leaflet. A twenty-one year old private with approximately four months service. Had landed on Leyte about 12 Dec 44. Born in Shanghai, he lived there twenty of his twenty-one years and had never been to Japan. Had touched upon Formosa when conscripted. This young prisoner was to be of invaluable aid to us the last firefight.

At about 1200I Lt Wortham's patrol and S/Sgt Aney's party arrived at CP.

First Battalion of 127 Inf passed the CP at 1300I, moving W. Captain Bettcher's patrol received notice to prepare to return to rear echelon on or about 2 Jan 45. Our mission was completed.

30 Dec 44 to 2 Jan 45 inclusive.

At about 1900I, 30 Dec 44, a native came running to our CP. The Captain and Lt Steele went outside to speak to him. The civilian was so very excited he could hardly speak coherently. All he could say was, "Many Japs, Many Japs!" Upon closer questioning, we ascertained that he had been so frightened that he did not stop to look. He could not say for sure where they were moving. Nor could he tell the Captain how many Japanese he had seen and their approximate location. (Let us refer to a message written by the Captain four days prior to the above episode). (Quote, "261010I. To: G-2: Native reports not very reliable any more due to proximity of enemy. Natives very excitable and every little movement means Japs to them", unquote.)

The Captain directed that the one LMG be moved into a position on the right flank (facing E.) The patrol turned in for the night.

At 0245I, 31 Dec 44, the patrol was awakened by small arms fire on the right flank. The Captain, Lt Steele and Lt Wortham immediately established a perimeter. There was intermittent small arms fire for a short while. During this time the enemy could be hear shouting orders and moving about.

At the start of the firefight, we had estimated fifty to sixty enemy soldiers.

As the situation developed, we began to hear many voices nearby and also at a distance. The enemy had spread out to a position extending from the NW of our perimeter E and around the right flank to the SE.

During this time, the POW had been informing the Captain of enemy movements and dispositions by the use of readily understandable sign language.

About 0300I, two attacks were repulsed by small arms automatic fire. One attack took place on the right flank, the other to the NE of our perimeter. Thereupon the enemy retired and deployed on around the right flank until they were directly S of the perimeter.

The enemy strength was now estimated to be between 275 to 300 soldiers, if not more. They had two heavy mortars and one light mortar. One heavy machine and two light machine guns, grenade launchers and many small arms. Their position, when set up, was triangular. One heavy mortar to the NE, one heavy mortar to the NW and a light mortar due S. The heavy machine gun was placed NE of our right flank and or and one light machine gun was placed SE of the same position. The other LMG was situated due N of the perimeter. The areas in between were filled by small arms.

The right flank outpost guard, Pvt John A Curwin, had been killed while holding off the enemy at the start of the firefight. Immediately thereafter S/Sgt Aney ran out of a building on his way to a firing position behind a tree. At that time, the right flank was caught in machine gun cross fire and S/Sgt Aney was killed. Tec 5 Herbert W Rodda and Pvt Felix P Klimas were forced to move the IMG to an alternate position. The cross fire had also wounded several of our soldiers along the perimeter. About 0315I, the enemy began subjecting our position to grenade and mortar fire. Our position was silhouetted in the moonlight and made it reasonably easy for the enemy to target in. We had only one 60 MM mortar and a few rounds available for return fire. Once more the fight slowed down to intermittent firing. Thruout the firefight, the aidmen, Tec 3 Leighton G Field and Sgt Tony Gaidosik performed meritoriously. Prior to the wounding of our men, they had fought on the line and had assisted in firing the mortar. When we had casualties, they went to work under fire, quickly, calmly and efficiently.

At about 0330I, the firing increased in intensity. The right flank was again subjected to cross fire. The IMG was knocked out of the crew's hands. They moved to their second alternate position and continued firing. Again the IMG was caught in the fire and both troopers were wounded seriously. Tec 5 Rodda was shot thru the mouth and Pvt Klimas was wounded in the neck and arm. They were ordered to go within the perimeter for medical attention while others manned the weapon. Instead, they moved to a third alternate position where they were again subjected to intense fire. The gun was again shot from their hands and Tec 5 Rodda lost two fingers. S/Sgt Cagle and Tec 5 William A Toman dragged them from the gun and manned the weapon themselves.

About 0345I, the enemy mortar fire began falling within our position. The CP was struck twice. The center of the perimeter was struck several times. At approximately 0355I, the Captain stood up and moved to the corner of the CP building with intentions of organizing a withdrawal.

At that moment, the mortar due S of our position fired and the shell landed about three feet behind the Captain. The Captain's right leg was practically blown off and fragments had wounded him in several places thruout his body. Tec 5 Edwin F Esaman, a radio operator, who had been watching the POW, was thrown to the ground and sustained a severe blow on the right side of his face.

When this occurred, Lt Steele was lying prone on the perimeter directly in front of the Captain. One of the men called to the Lt telling him the Captain was wounded. Lt Steele thereupon ran to the Captain's side. A temporary web belt tourniquet was placed on the Captain's leg and the aidman called. Morphine was injected.

The Captain authorized Lt Steele to contact the infantry. By 0400I, the 128 Inf had been contacted and told the situation. 128 Inf was requested to sent the transmission on to the 127 Inf. The 127 Inf had an OP about 1500 yards W of our position but we were unable to contact them. Lt Steele checked the perimeter for the Captain. Then, with the assistance of Lt Wortham, S/Sgt Cagle and several responsible junior non-coms, organized a withdrawal to the SW. Before leaving, both Lt Steele and Lt Wortham attempted to salvage two units of blood plasma from the CP. However, the building was struck by mortar fire and constantly raked with machine gun fire and they were unable to do so.

At about 0445I, the knoll was cleared of all troopers except for the dead. About 500 yards SW of the CP, the Captain began going into shock. The aidman advised against moving any further. Lt Steele went ahead to contact the Infantry for medical aid and other assistance. He took 8 men and 1 aidman and 3 most seriously wounded with him. Lt Wortham remained with the Captain and the men and has S/Sgt Cagle set up a perimeter while they waited.

During this time, the POW had remained with Lt Steele, who had placed a 300 series radio on his back, prior to the withdrawal. Lt Steele instructed him to remain with the Captain when he left to establish contact with the Infantry.

At about 0445I Lt Steele reached the 127 Inf "C" Co outpost, Silad. He took care of his wounded and segregated his men. He was unable to contact the battalion headquarters as communication with the CP had ceased until 0700I, 31 Dec 44. He then contacted the artillery observer officer on duty at the CP who, in turn, made arrangements for a cub to drop plasma at dawn. Lt Steele then called the REcon troopers who were not wounded together, oriented them on the situation and gave them the following instructions. "Return to Lt Wortham. Have the Captain moved to a grove or otherwise hidden. Make another attempt to obtain the plasma from the CP. Bring the rest of the wounded to the Infantry OP." Tec 5 Inman was placed in charge of the patrol.

At approximately 0520I, Tec 5 Inman contacted Lt Wortham, who had been forced to move several times because of the close proximity of the enemy. During this time the enemy had completed their encirclement of the CP and subsequently overran the position, making it impossible to reenter the CP.

There was no alternative, so Lt Wortham lead the entire party to the Infantry OP, and arrived at about 0615I.

The cub dropped plasma at 0800I, 31 Dec 44. The Troop Commander was declared dead at about 0810I. All efforts had been made to apply the plasma. An incision had been made in order to locate a vein and inject the plasma. All efforts failed. Wounds were discovered that had been hidden by the darkness and which must have bled profusely.

The Recon Troopers were notified of their Captain's death and the following re-organizing arrangements were made. Natives were sent to scout the former CP. When they reported the area clear, civilian carriers were organized and all equipment and S/Sgt Aney's and Pvt Curwin's bodies were recovered. Radios were sent up to contact and inform division of the situation and to await orders. A recount of men and casualties was taken. Arrangements were made to move unwounded troopers on to the Infantry OP perimeter.

Instructions were received for the disposition of bodies and wounded. The bodies were to be taken to 127 Inf and from there transported to the rear. The wounded were likewise evacuated.

Total casualties sustained by the patrol was 3 KIA and 7 WIA.

Control of the troop, in the field, was passed to Lt Steele thru a division order. When the wounded and bodies and POW were evacuated, Lt Steele remained with a strength of 2 officers and 43 enlisted men.

During the hours of darkness, the enemy had moved NW to a position on a ridge 800 yards NE of the "C" Co outpost. Thruout the morning there was intermittent firing between the OP on the left flank and the enemy. During the afternoon the 2d Battalion of 127 Inf attacked the enemy positions with two companies and was twice repulsed.

The night of 31 Dec 44 was passed on the OP perimeter. During the night the enemy moved part of its force around the OP generally in a southwesterly direction toward Villaba. That particular group stopped long enough to fire several rounds of mortar fire. Only casualties were one civilian killed and eight civilians wounded.

On 1 Jan 45, The Reconnaissance Troop was ordered to join the 127 Inf in preparation for movement to a new staging area. The 127 Inf was reached at 1200I, 1 Jan 45. The three bodies were still with 127 Inf. The troop was given an area within the perimeter and remained therein until 1200I, 2 Jan 45.

At approximately 1300I, 2 Jan 45, the Reconnaissance Troop embarked at Silad Bay for transportation to the rear. The bodies were carried aboard ship. The patrol arrived at the troop area at about 2100I, 2 Jan 45. The bodies were buried the morning of 3 Jan 45 in USAF cemetery at Limon, Leyte, Central Philippines.

Mission completed.

Many civilians in the Bagbean and Mataroto area were pro-Japanese. On two separate occasions, we saw armed civilians leading enemy columns.

Civilians should not possess arms, enemy weapons or otherwise. They are a menace to anyone in the vicinity. Grenades should be confiscated for they do not know how to use them.

The night we were attacked by an estimated 50 to 60 enemy soldiers at the Agayayan CP, the natives grabbed up several weapons, among them the troop commander's. That being another of the many reasons why they should always be kept clear of the troops. Another day one of the native boys ran out across the field wildly firing a sub-machine gun he had taken out of the CP. He managed to disrupt efforts to capture two prisoners.

The officers must constantly keep civilians under observation. Investigate suspected civilians rather than allow them a free hand. For example, Lt Steele had an overlay - a curious civilian (who later proved harmless) was detained for questioning when the CP was located at Taygaytay. He had constantly tried to look at transmissions and maps. He had asked questions regarding troop strength and weapons. He had recently arrived from Ormoc, and at times, he would leave for two or three days and then return. All this added up to a great deal of circumstantial evidence that was soon discounted by many sources.

Again, on 31 Dec 44, after the firefight a suspected civilian family was seen in the vicinity of the Silad CP. Lt Steele had them detained for the time the enemy remained in close proximity.

As guides, it is imperative that they speak and understand English. When questioning natives, one finds that they will invariably say "yes" to anything they do not understand. When the answer should be "No" they say "Yes" and vice versa. A patrol leader has an infinitely more difficult time with a native who does not speak English than he would have by operating without a guide. When in close proximity to the enemy, the slightest movement to an excited guide indicates a sizeable Japanese force. Many times they point out civilians as being Japanese.

Another, and not minor point, in dealing with civilians is the currency used. At times the patrol must buy its food. The natives readily honor American "Victory" money as medium of exchange and accept Guerilla money only after much persuasion.

T-H-E G-U-E-R-I-L-L-A

Our experience in the field with these men, was for the most part, very unsatisfactory.

The average Guerilla has no conception of basic soldiering. For example, instead of following covered routes, they will invariably cross open terrain. They have not been trained to stalk and participate in a coordinated action. They do have fair success when ambushing enemy troops. However, even when in close proximity to the enemy they are noisy and cough and pass wind frequently.

Another object lesson was received when the Cananga OP had set an ambush. Two enemy soldiers approached. Our troopers were waiting for them to approach to within close range - and a Guerilla pulled his bolt. Immediately one Japanese dropped to the prone and managed to escape. The other, with less presence of mind, turned his body to run and was shot and killed.

In a real firefight they are excitable and difficult to control.

They do not appreciate the importance of prisoners - and would rather torture and kill them than hold them for interrogation.

Upon killing an enemy soldier, one must not expect them to turn in identification and personal belongings. Upon several occasions, we were told by a Guerilla Lt and his men that the Japanese killed possessed absolutely nothing. Later the civilians told our commanding officer that the Guerillas had hidden the Japanese equipment in the bushes and had later taken it away. Of course, as in any occupation, there are exceptions to the general rule, but they are decidedly rare where Guerillas are concerned.

The Guerillas operate more or less as bandits in the field. When we reached Agayayan, the civilians told us of being beaten and chastised by the Guerillas for being unable to meet with their demands for food.

Civilians often commented upon the manner in which the troop officers comported themselves and associated with their men. The Guerilla officers, in contrast, required civilians to wash and starch their clothes daily. When a creek had to be crossed, or a muddy stretch traversed, they were carried across by their men.

The real value of any Guerilla is as a guide only. And then he must be able to speak and understand English reasonably well.

R - E - A - R

E - C - H - E - L - O - N

Thruout the campaign, the Troop Rear Echelon made several moves. Captain Bottsher's patrol left the troop at Pinamapean, Leyte, Central Philippines, and at the termination of the campaign, the patrol returned to a new staging area.

At the start of the campaign, the Troop area came under enemy artillery fire and air raids daily.

On 19 Nov 44, 1st /Sgt Thomas L Bartlett was deafened in his left ear by a grenade blast when he, S/Sgt Donal H Aney and S/Sgt Francis W White were ambushed about 0400I, on way to Capocogan from Pinamapean, Leyte, Central Philippines. They escaped at 0600I.

Thruout the campaign, several patrols were sent out to locate enemy artilley emplacements and also to reconnoiter the coast and investigate small craft lying off shore

Bernard J. Lillie

BERNARD J LILLIE

1st Lieutenant, Cavalry,
Commanding.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, A-G-O

REPORT AFTER ACTION

32^d RCN TR MECZ

26 DEC 44-21 JAN 45

32 DIV

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32d CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE TROOP MECHANIZED
32d Infantry Division
APO 32

LEC/rmr
28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Supplementary Report After Action covering the period
26 Dec 44 to 21 Jan 45 of the Leyte, Central Philippine
Operation.

TO : Commanding General, Headquarters 32d Infantry Division,
APO 32.

1. Brief summary of action against the enemy during the period
mentioned above is as follows:

26 Dec 44

Captain Bottcher's patrol consisting of (32) EM was located
at MAMBIGAO (MAP: Coordinates 26.8-65.1). Lieutenant Wortham's
patrol had come from LUBIRANAN (MAP: Coordinates 31.8-56.7) on 21
Dec 44. Lieutenant Steele was with Captain Bottcher. A CP had
been established. (1) POW who had been captured by Lieutenant
Wortham's patrol on 25 Dec 44 in the vicinity was taken to base by
2 EM. Lieutenant Wortham and (7) EM left at 0730I going due W to-
wards CAMPOFO BAY. Lieutenant Steele and (8) EM left at 0930I going
SW towards SILAD BAY. Captain Bottcher and (15) EM remained at the
CP. Isolated small groups of Japs were seen by both of our patrols
during the day.

27 Dec 44

Lieutenant Steele established an OP on a ridge approximately
800 yards E of SILAD BAY (MAP: Coordinates 24.8-60.2). Lieutenant
Wortham also established an OP overlooking CAMPOFO BAY at approximately
(MAP: Coordinates 23.5-68.0). Enemy patrols were noted headed W
towards the coast and one group of approximately 30 to 40 Japs were
seen going N from SILAD BAY area. No enemy activity at CP located
at MAMBIGAO.

28 Dec 44

Captain Bottcher and (15) EM joined Lieutenant Steele at the
outpost (with 20 carriers) at 1600I. Lieutenant Wortham was still
in the CAMPOFO area. At 1700I one Jap came into the OP with a sur-
render leaflet and gave himself up. He had no documents and very
little information as he had been on Leyte since 12 Dec 44 and had
been in the Japanese Army only (4) months. This POW was kept at
the OP and caused no trouble but was very cooperative.

332-CAV-0.3-14/ARpt-1-1-32nd Cav Recon Troop (mech)-32nd Inf Div-26 Dec 44-21 Jan 45
Submitted

29 Dec 44

At 0800I the CP was moved approximately 1500 yards ENE to (MAP: Coordinates 25.5-61.1). (2) OP's were established on ridges to the N and W. Also one OP located to S of the CP. Lieutenant Wortham's patrol arrived at OP at 1430I. S/Sgt Aney and patrol of (22) EM had left CONSUEGRA (MAP: Coordinates 30.8-67.6) on 28 Dec 44. This patrol arrived and joined forces at the CP at 1330I, moving W. A message was received by Captain Bottcher to the effect that his patrol intact was to return to Base on or about 2 Jan 45.

30 Dec 44

Since First Bn, 127 Inf were now located to N and W of CP, our outposts were withdrawn. The outposts to the S and E were maintained. At 1900I a native reported a large Jap force to the ESE of our CP. One IMG was placed in the CP facing to the E, the outpost was drawn in to protect and maintain the IMG position. Guards were posted at each end of CP area.

31 Dec 44

At 0245I the enemy attacked from the E killing (2) EM instantly. The ensuing fire fight lasted approximately (2) hours and during this time Capt Bottcher was seriously injured by an enemy mortar shell. (7) EM were wounded. Enemy strength was estimated to be approximately 275 to 300 with 2 heavy mortars, 1 light mortar, 1 HMG, 2 IMG, and many small arms. At approximately 0500I the remainder of the patrol withdrew to the W. Captain Bottcher died from shock and loss of blood at 0810I. All efforts to save him with plasma and first aid failed due to the mortal injuries he had received. The patrol joined with elements of 127 Inf. At 1100I, natives returned to the old CP area and brought back the bodies of the (2) EM who had been killed. The bodies were delivered to 127 Inf CP at 1430I. All the wounded men were able to walk. (4) wounded EM, the POW and (1) EM guarding the prisoner went to the 127 Inf aid station on the coast at SILAD BAY and spent the night there. Balance of patrol went on perimeter defense with 127 Inf.

1 Jan 45

Wounded men, POW and (1) EM guarding were evacuated from SILAD BAY by barge to PALO, LEYTE arriving there at 1600I. Balance of patrol left 127 Inf perimeter area and proceeded W to SILAD BAY arriving there at 1400I and remained there for the night.

2 Jan 45

Attempts were made to transport the bodies of Captain Bottcher and (2) EM by cub to no avail. The patrol loaded on barges at 1600I with the bodies and were taken to vicinity of CARIGARA arriving there at 2100I. The bodies were taken to the Troop area and all men rejoined Troop Headquarters at 2200I ----Mission completed.

3 Jan 45

(3) dead men were buried in USAF cemetery at LIMON, Leyte, Central Philippines.

4 Jan 45

(5) EM departed Troop Headquarters for AGAYAYAN (MAP: Coordinates 32.3-56.8) to recover body of (1) EM who had been buried there 21 Nov 44.

5 Jan 45

Patrol sent to AGAYAYAN arrived there 1100I, secured the body, and returned to Troop Headquarters arriving there approximately 1830I. Body was delivered to USAF cemetery at LIMON, Leyte, Central Philippines at 1700I. On the way to AGAYAYAN, (30) EM escorted this patrol to AGAYAYAN. These men were from 77th Division. At 0900I, a small force of Japs was encountered. 5 enemy were killed, and 2 were wounded but escaped. Our forces had no casualties. These Japs were killed approximately 2 kilometers S of AGAYAYAN.

From 6 Jan 45 to 21 Jan 45, members of this organization were not engaged in any action against the enemy.

BERNARD J LILLIE
1st Lt., Cavalry,
Commanding.